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This thesis takes the form of a poststructural autoethnography. It explores self as 
event in order to illustrate the fluid nature of self identities, and is informed by the 
writings of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. 
In tandem with these theorists, I turn to the work of Michael White, narrative 
therapist, in my use of his Migration of Identity map (White, 1995) and the eight-
point conversational map he developed to address personal failure (White, 2002).  
 
The launching points for my research were selected stories that significantly 
shaped my life, specifically two storylines of how I became mired in problem 
stories of blame and failure that lead to exhaustion and burnout. Taking a 
poststructural narrative therapeutic perspective has opened up space to bring 
forward subordinate, alternative stories that were previously overpowered by 
problem stories. In the process of troubling the discourses, and sedimented 
practices of those events and their subsequent effects, I have had opportunity to 
open up the possibility of transformation – taking off in lines of flight. Through 
plugging in to Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts, I also explore a professional 
relationship I had with my plastic surgeon across the decomposition and re-
composition of facial identity. 
 
Drawing on the work of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) made transformation 
possible, a freeing up of the constraining lines of force, movement that takes the 
research subject (my self) into different territory of being. The research became an 
opportunity to explore a migration of identity and to act to open the possibility for 
conceiving of self as fluid, a work in progress, self as a work of art.  
 
Writing plays an important part in this research and in bringing the self into 
existence. To this end, the thesis charts the course of a journey of compassionately 
witnessing self, and in the process, both reveals and troubles the positions offered 
and refused by the subject.  
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Finally, this autoethnography is a journey towards ethical reflexive practice as it 
connects me to my desire to do the right thing – to become an ethical counselling 
practitioner, and to highlight the movement of becoming. I understand this 
reflexivity to be a continual process that makes possible a questioning of practice 
that explores effects of the work I do, how it contributes to others’ lives, and how 
others contribute to my life. I explore the process of becoming different through 
this witnessing of self, and, in the process, discover how this makes a 
compassionate witnessing of other possible. Witnessing of other brings me closer 
to doing hope in community, while, at the same time, scales it down to make it 
do-able, reasonable hope. This heightened awareness makes possible the 
witnessing of sparkling moments in therapeutic conversations and makes visible 
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Chapter One: Situating my study 
 
After four years of university study I completed a Bachelor of Arts. I applied for a 
number of positions, and was eventually employed as an advertising consultant 
for a major daily metropolitan newspaper. I was employed to sell general 
advertising space in the newspaper. I enjoyed this role, as it was peripatetic and 
people-centred. I experienced success in this role, as I had a warm relationship 
with clients and managed to reach my sales targets. After three months I was 
promoted to the coveted position of advertising sales manager for the newspaper’s 
monthly fashion publication. In this role I was responsible for the marketing, 
publicity, and promotion of the magazine and for the organisation of a number of 
fashion events. I learned valuable organisational and administrative skills and, 
under my stewardship, the publication grew. The downside of this growth, 
however, was that the job eventually became too big for one person. The company 
was reluctant to employ another person to help me in my role as the business was 
experiencing the effects of a recession. In response, I re-doubled my efforts and 
worked harder to keep up. I took this path as this was my first real job, and I 
valued my role, and was proud of the work I did. As sole manager I also felt a 
sense of responsibility for maintaining the success of the publication, as I knew 
that my labours generated, in part, the income that allowed the newspaper to 
function, and which contributed to the salaries of employees. I was also inspired 
to work harder as both of my parents value the work ethic and I had learned the 
importance of this from them. The work ethic that I valued had been captured by 
advanced capitalism/neoliberalism/globalisation and the market economy, and an 
ability to work hard and without complaint indicated worldly success, and 
personal salvation. This over-work meant that I began to experience the effects of 
exhaustion and dissatisfaction. 
 
Becoming disillusioned with the work, I looked longingly towards the careers of 
the journalists, sub-editors, and editors on the staff of the newspaper. They 
seemed so confident and purpose-full, and I knew that their work was taken 
seriously and was valued for the service it provided to the community, city and 
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region. Their evident confidence, skills and competence reminded me of the 
dreams of my self as a star on television that I had when I was five-years-old.  
 
 
In the photo I am five 
 
In the photo I am five.  
 
I am curled up on our rocking chair in the lounge.  
 
My hands are tucked under my chin and I am intently watching television. 
It is a show like ‘Bewitched’, or  ‘Petticoat Junction’, or ‘My Three Sons’.   
 
I love watching television.  I want to be on television. I want to be a star. 
  
It is my bedtime. I really don’t want to go to bed. I want to stay up with the 
grownups and watch the big people’s television shows.  
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Reluctantly, accompanied by the faint tantalising refrains of the TV show 
theme music emanating from the living room, I aim my slippers towards 
my bedroom, and slowly shuffle down the hallway to bed.  
  
Later, I creep down the hallway and stand silently in the dark chilly hall 
watching forbidden programmes through the crack in the living room 
door. 
 
I hear the creak of my father shifting in the rocking chair and I scuttle like 
a beetle back to my room on silent feet.  
 
The creaking settles. Stealthily I return to my post by the living room door. 
 
Dwelling on this five-year-old’s dream, I decided to retrain as a journalist, with 
the goal of becoming a television reporter and presenter. I applied for journalism 
school and was unsuccessful. I was still looking for a way of materialising the 
dream, when I had a car accident. This resulted in serious injuries including facial 
disfigurement. A year of surgeries and rehabilitation followed. The dream of 
becoming a television journalist and appearing on screen drifted further and 
further away.  
 
Post-accident 
After the car accident I was unable to work during the months it took to learn to 
walk again and recover from the many reconstructive surgeries I had. I felt a 
lowered sense of self-worth and a nagging sense of in-validity as I was not being a 
productive member of society. This feeling of inadequacy led me to think about 
reconnecting with my dream, albeit a modified version. A year after the accident, 
before my last major reconstructive surgery, I took the first small steps towards 
this modified version of the dream. I completed two courses in video production 
at a tertiary institution. These gave me the chance to look at life closely, in minute 
detail, through the camera lens. Editing moving images together taught me that 
different meanings could be made through the choice of juxtaposed images and 
transitions between those images, and that time could be manipulated to appear 
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slowed down or sped up.  
 
The dream of working in front of the camera became the dream of working behind 
the camera. I enrolled in a graduate diploma in media studies at another tertiary 
institution. During this study I further honed my video production and media 
studies skills, and I also studied various television production roles. Undertaking 
this study grew my dream to work behind the camera as a producer. My obvious 
passion and love for both the production and theoretical work resulted in being 
offered a scholarship to undertake a Masters of Arts majoring in media studies. I 
enjoyed learning more about the theory and practice of the media. Through the 
course of my studies, the department employed me as a tutor and I relished 
teaching likeminded undergraduate students. Upon graduation, I had the good 
fortunate to be offered a Senior Tutor position lecturing on a number of tertiary 
video production courses. This part-time lecturing allowed me to share my 
passion for video production with the students I taught over a three-year period I 
worked in this role. During this time I also managed a number of tutors.  
 
This position led to opportunities to produce a number of documentaries, video 
production training resources, and television advertisements. I enjoyed teaching 
courses in moving image and I trained as a media studies teacher in secondary 
schools so I could work fulltime. Upon completion of my Graduate Diploma in 
Teaching I gained employment in a high school as the head of a large media 
studies department. Teaching students became an exciting and rewarding part of 
my teacher identity. The work energised me, and I was often described by the 
students as an inspirational and enthusiastic teacher. In this role I taught the 
students documentary video production skills which made available to them the 
tools to create and tell their own stories. In this role I also worked to make 
transparent how power operates in, and through, the media. In order to support 
this we traversed economic, historical and political territory. One example that 
comes to mind is the discussion on the New Zealand political system and 
questioning of the consequences for democracy. At that stage New Zealand was 
the only OECD country without a televisual public service broadcaster. Engaging 
in political discussions about Rogernomics and the right wing market ethos of 
neoliberalism opened up opportunities for the students to consider important 
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questions around the dissemination of information, and the relationship between 
the market and the state. My passion for the work led me to grow my expertise 
through contracts with governmental agencies. Becoming an accomplished 
teacher of media studies and head of the department meant that I expanded my 
knowledge and understanding of the delivery of the curriculum, as well as school 
administration and middle management processes.  
 
After eight years in this role I recognised the signs of overload that I had ignored 
prior to the accident. I resigned from my teaching position. Upon reflection, I took 
on too much work and the reason for this was that I was positioned and talked my 
self into having to do it all. Growing up, I was assured by my feminist mother and 
teachers that I could do anything – on the condition that I was prepared to 
compete and work hard. I supported this position as I valued equality, and I 
wished to break through the glass ceiling. The striations of the discourse of hard 
work called upon women to work hard, and women took up this challenge. The 
reverberation of this discourse was strongly present in my life, and it had an 
ambiguous hold on me as I felt that it was something that was required of me: as it 
added to my sense of self-worth. However, this positioning resulted in inviting a 
superwoman idea, which I took up. I believe this expectation contributed to the 
work-stress related motor vehicle accident. I experienced the downside of the 
expectation as a sense of failure, and a possible ‘burnout’ for a second time. I 
blamed myself for not looking after myself. This blame implied that I did not 
know my limits and it was my own fault for taking on too much work. The lack of 
work/life balance, therefore, reflected poorly on my identity and I took up a 
position that this failure was my responsibility. It was my fault that I lacked 
assertiveness to say no to opportunities and failed to achieve a work/life balance.  
 
At that stage I wanted to make a career change that would open up the possibility 
of part-time work. I was also looking for an academic challenge that would stretch 
me. During my time teaching, I enjoyed working in a pastoral care role as an 
assistant dean. This led me to consider re-training as a school guidance 
counsellor, so I applied and was accepted onto the Master of Counselling 
programme at the University of Waikato. 
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Compassionate witnessing of my self: Compassion fatigue 
The impetus of this study began with my interest in the episodes of burnout 
mentioned above. A further invitation to embark on this research journey arose as 
I prepared for my presentation that would be given during a noho marae at 
Maniaroa. This presentation is an assignment in the Discourse and Counselling 
Psychologies paper coordinated by Dr. Elmarie Kotzé. This paper is one of four 
core papers in the Masters of Counselling programme. I presented to my fellow 
students, Kathie and Elmarie, and Whāea Hinekahukura (Tuti) Aranui 
(Maniapoto). I focussed on three aspects that I considered shaped my worker 
identity significantly. These strands that I touched on were the work ethic, 
work/life balance and a patriarchal view of women. I chose these three strands, as 
I wanted to start to make visible the shaping effects on my worker identity. I 
wanted make meaning of the burnout I had experienced at the end of my careers. 
 
A meaning-full process occurred after my presentation. Two students from the 
group were invited to reflect on my presentation (see Crocket & Kotzé, 2011). 
Their witnessing practice was informed by Weingarten’s (2000) work on 
compassionately witnessing of the self and the other, as well as White’s (2007) 
definitional ceremony or outsider witness ritual (White, 2007, pp. 189-218). My 
two colleagues reflected on how my presentation resonated with, and moved 
them. As a part of this witnessing practice, Associate Professor Kathie Crocket 
wrote and presented a short rescued speech poem based on words that she had 
captured from my brief ten-minute presentation. My colleagues and Kathie’s 
words began to help me to turn away from the harsh position of self-blame I had 
taken towards my self for burning out. This compassionate witnessing supported 
me to start to stand up to these very strong invitations of blame and opened small 
beginnings of “troubling” (Davies, 2000b, p.14) the positioning of harshness that I 
had taken up towards my self.  
 
During the course of my studies I was privileged to participate in, and be the 
recipient of, a number of outsider witness ceremonies. In particular, one outsider 
witness ritual generated the story that features in chapter four and also turned me 
towards reflecting on compassion fatigue (Figley, 2002) invitations to failure 
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(White, 2002), and liminality (White, 1995). 
 
White’s ideas: Migration of identity and liminality 
White’s (1995) idea of the migration of identity, combined with the 
poststructuralist ideas I was exposed to, resonated with me as leaving teaching 
and becoming a counsellor meant that I was invited to take up new ways of being 
and thinking, and also question and relinquish ways of thinking that no longer 
served me. This idea of migration of identity (White, 1995) awoke in me the 
realization that there had been other times in my life when I had experienced 
liminality. White (1995) describes the experience of liminality that occurs within 
migration of identity as the: 
distance between the point of separation from the …context and the point 
of arrival at some preferred location in life, and at some alternative and 
preferred account of one’s identity. There is always some distance 
between these two points in terms of time…In this ‘liminal’ or ‘betwixt 
and between’ space, confusion and disorientation reigns, and often nothing 
seems manageable any more…[the person is] vulnerable to a sense of total 
incompetence and personal failure, to feelings of desperation and acute 
despair. (pp. 99-100) 
 
White’s (1995) ideas offered me the opportunity for me to draw upon experiences 
of migration of identity as a way of becoming an ethical practitioner. This thesis is 
an attempt to compassionately witness self and other and to take small steps 
towards shifting identity/ies. White’s ideas about narrative practice (2007), the 
reading I did for my studies, and the presentation I gave on the marae, began to 
generate an understanding as to how strands from discourses had informed me 
and how I contributed to taken-for-granted ideas. This opened the possibility to 






Beginning the journey of this thesis 
I started off on my journey into this research by thinking and investigating how I 
could work ethically and sustainably as a counsellor, as my previous careers had 
been affected by burnout. Initially, I read and collected information about burnout 
that was written in a structuralist vein that located “burnout” as a problem of an 
“internal state understanding” (White, 2007, pp.103-106). Thomas (2004) 
explains that therapists who work within a structuralist framework assume that 
there is an inner, fixed and stable self. The work of a therapist positioned within 
this framework is to diagnose behaviour that a client displays as related to “the 
workings of the person’s inner-self/nature/psyche” (Thomas, 2004, p. 94). Once a 
diagnosis is made, treatment is prescribed to counteract, or cure the dysfunctional 
behaviour. From a structuralist or humanist perspective, burnout is thus conceived 
as a gradual process that occurs as a consequence of exposure to unrelenting job 
stress. Maslach and Jackson (1981) describe burnout as, “a syndrome of 
emotional exhaustion and cynicism that occurs frequently among individuals who 
do people-work of some kind” (p. 99). Cordes and Dougherty (1993) argue that 
the core dimension of emotional exhaustion is the first stage of burnout, which is 
then followed by depersonalization, as a coping strategy. The outcome of burnout 
is cynicism, and a sense of failure (Figley, 1997).  This is finally followed by 
feelings of reduced personal accomplishment (Saint-Louis, 2010). Burnout is thus 
the responsibility of the person experiencing it and invites personal failure 
practices (see White, 2002). 
 
Through my reading I came across Figley’s (1982, 1992, 1997) concept of 
compassion fatigue. While situated still within a structuralist perspective, it 
seemed to fit more closely to the burnout experienced by people working to care 
for others, such as in counselling, nursing, and social work. If a therapist 
experiences compassion fatigue they work more, rather than less. Their health, 
their personal lives and eventually their relationships with clients end up suffering 
(Figley, 2002).  Similar to structuralist research into burnout, studies in 
compassion fatigue do not address the discourses that help to shape it. However, 
the concept of compassion fatigue sat more comfortably with me, as it seemed to 
be a less harsh concept than burnout.  
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From a structuralist perspective, compassion fatigue is a state of extreme 
dissatisfaction with one’s work, which emerges suddenly, and with little warning 
(Figley, 1997). It tends to be associated with the cost of caring (Figley, 1982) for 
others in emotional pain. Compassion fatigue is known in the field of 
traumatology as vicarious traumatisation (McCann & Pearlman, 1989; Pearlman 
& Saakvitne, 1995), secondary victimisation (Figley, 1982), secondary traumatic 
stress (Figley, 1992, Stamm, 1995; 1997), and secondary survivor (Remer and 
Elliott, 1988). From a structuralist perspective, compassion fatigue is seen to be a 
direct result of the therapist’s exposure to client trauma and can be complicated by 
lack of support in both the workplace and the home. Compassion fatigue is often 
disconnected from real causes and is characterised by a sense of helplessness, 
confusion, isolation and low energy. The person experiencing compassion fatigue 
feels powerless, irritable, and overwhelmed (Figley, 1997). In other words, a 
therapist experiencing compassion fatigue has been burned out by the kind of 
work that they do, the kind of clients that they have, and trauma-effect from 
working with these clients.  
 
After reading the structuralist perspective on burnout and compassion fatigue 
described above, I then read in the landscape of poststructuralism and narrative 
therapy, which opened up a new field of research curiosity for me. A 
poststructuralist approach does not assume that there is any fixed or knowable 
self, so a therapist operating from this philosophical perspective conceives of 
identity being formed in relationships with others and in, and through, language 
and discourses. Morgan (2002) argues that if a therapist wishes to take up a 
position to work narratively, s/he is invited to become “interested in ways of 
facilitating non-structuralist enquiries” (p. 53). The narrative therapist questions 
taken-for-granted ideas in the counselling conversation that may have contributed 
to thin descriptions that the person may have about their life and identity. The 
narrative therapist takes up a position that separates the person from the problem 
(Morgan, 2000; Thomas, 2004; White, 2007), and considers that both s/he and the 
client are shaped in relationship through language in the therapeutic conversation. 
Adopting this way of working, positions the therapist to take up a respectful and 
curious position to work collaboratively with the client to “consider how the 
stories of our lives shape our lives and how therapy might enable the rich 
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description of preferred stories of identity” (Thomas, 2004, p. 97). White (1997) 
advocates a taking-it-back practice where the therapist recognises and 
acknowledges to the client, and their colleagues, that their work with the client 
has contributed to their own lives. For White (1997) a taking-it-back practice is an 
ethical practice as it attempts to address the power imbalance in the therapeutic 
relationship, and he also argues that this practice supports the therapist to resist 
the messages of burnout/compassion fatigue.  
 
The research curiosity that was generated as a consequence of the reading and 
thinking that I was doing became: How can I work ethically and sustainably in my 
new career as a counsellor?   
 
Care of the self: Technologies of the self/ethical practice 
In this thesis I address this research curiosity through the use of two poststructural 
modes of analysis, namely Michael White’s (2002) Foucauldian inspired failure 
conversation map, in chapter five, and Deleuzo-Guattarian (1987) desire and 
becoming in relation, becoming-woman, as well as lines of flight in chapter six.  
 
The goal of this work is to take up the invitation offered by Foucault (1985, 
1994b, 1994d) and create an ethical self as a work of art; to make visible the fluid 
movement of identity, or becoming self as event (see Jackson, 2010). Because we 
can never be outside of discourse, I draw on Derridean (1976, 1992a, 1992b) 
deconstruction to unsettle taken-for-granted ideas of power/knowledge. My self 
is, therefore, the object/subject of this poststructural autoethnography and the aim 
is to explore the formation of my self as subject (see Foucault, 1982), or self as 
event (see Jackson, 2010). Through this work I uncover the historically specific 
sets of rules (discourses) that have constituted me as subject/object (see Foucault, 
1972, p. 48) and the extent to which I took up and resisted these. My goal here is 
to make visible the invisible taken-for-granted ideas of discourses and discover 
the traces of their effects on me as an emerging/becoming subject/object. Foucault 
(1972) states that such a project is important as: 
we must question those ready-made syntheses, those groupings that we 
normally accept before any examination, those links whose validity is 
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recognized from the outset; we must oust those forms and obscure forces 
by which we usually link the discourse of one man with that of another; 
they must driven out from the darkness in which they reign. (p. 22) 
In the process of taking up Foucault’s (1972) challenge of making visible the 
hidden workings of discourse, I uncover acts of agency (subjectivation), as well as 
subjugation for my self, through a microanalysis of the words and language I use 
in the stories to re-present the events and relationships the subject (my self) 
experiences. 
 
Chapter two of this thesis takes the form of an overview of selected aspects of the 
poststructural philosophical positions I adopt. Drawing from the relevant 
literature, the chapter provides a brief outline of the selected Foucauldian, 
Deleuzo-Guattarian, and Derridean concepts that I employ in this research. I 
selected these with my focus on a continuously forming identity/ies. I am 
interested in the idea that the self is fluid, and in a process of becoming, and 
excited by the possibilities made available for subjectivity when the boundaries 
between binaries that support key discourses are troubled (see Davies, 2000b).  
 
Because poststructuralism conceives of a fluid self in a process of always 
becoming, this study takes the form of a poststructuralist autoethnography. In 
chapter three I give an overview of a poststructuralist autoethnography as a 
methodology. Foucault’s ideas around technologies of the self are also explored. 
This thesis adopts a Derridean (1976, 1992a, 1992b) approach to trouble the 
boundaries between binaries (Davies, 2000b), and explores the question of 
identity formation in order to see identity anew. To this end, I use 
autoethnographic writing to conceive of my lived experience, body, and emotions 
as texts to be written and read. This research, therefore, opens up the possibility of 
understanding the fluid self as the possibility of multiple becomings. Gannon 
(2003) states that “a paradox arises for poststructural autoethnography in that 
autoethnographic research presumes that the subject can speak (for) herself, whilst 
poststructural theories disrupt this presumption and stress the (im)possibilities of 
writing the self from a fractured and fragmented subject position” (p. 288). The 
subject position made available by a poststructuralist perspective makes writing 
about the self virtually (im)possible (see Derrida & Ewald, 1995, p. 279, in 
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Gannon, 2006, p. 484) and this is explored further in chapter six.  
 
Chapter four introduces the techniques of poststructural autoethnography that I 
call upon in this study. In this chapter I also outline and justify the choice of the 
methods I use to generate the self-data that I analyse in chapters five and six.  
 
Chapter five is the first of two data analysis chapters. In this chapter I uncover a 
migration of identity in relation to the discourse of modern failure that occurred 
when I was six-years-old. In this chapter I explain White’s (2002) Foucauldian-
inspired method of analysis to map the failure of modern power. I then apply this 
method to a story re-presenting an early personal experience of failure in an 
educational setting. I undertake this exercise to apply Foucauldian ideas of 
technologies of the self and take up a position to act with agency so that 
transformation and self-creation as a work of art becomes possible.  
 
In chapter six, I adopt a Deleuzo-Guattarian (1987) approach to trace my self as 
an event, or becoming-woman in relationship with other/s. I write five stories to 
recount the loss of face/identity caused by a car accident and tell the process of 
facial reconstruction I underwent. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) invite an 
experimenting with thinking with their concepts such as desire, becoming-woman, 
the molar, the molecular, territorialisation, and lines of flight. I discover, in this 
chapter, that the coherent sense of self I have, transforms through relationship, 
through a line of flight (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) to reterritorialise in another 
territory altogether. In this chapter, I also call upon Davies (2000c) to make 
visible connections between the modernist architecture in the subject’s work 
environment and the subject’s subjugation and constitution as a worker. This 
exercise in exploring Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) concept of difference reveals 
it as a process of becoming different in relation to others and to self. 
  
In chapter seven, I draw conclusions about this work conceiving of self as event 




Chapter Two: Philosophical underpinnings 
 
During the course of my studies in counsellor education, I became interested in 
poststructuralist thinking about the fluid nature of identity and the mechanisms 
through which philosophers such as Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze consider 
identity as in a process of construction. A poststructuralist approach invites the 
unpacking of the taken-for-grantedness of lived events in order to see them from a 
new perspective. St. Pierre (2010) explains that:  
the grammatology of Derrida, the archaeology and genealogy of Foucault, 
and the schizoanalysis of Deleuze and Guattari, put the autonomous, 
present individual of humanism sous rature by positing that the subject 
does not exist ahead of or outside language, but is a dynamic, unstable 
effect of language, discourse and cultural practice. There are no stable 
referents for the subject, even for the speaking subject, the ‘I’. (p. 502) 
This study draws upon Derrida’s (1976, 1992a, 1992b) deconstructive philosophy, 
and Foucault’s analysis of the practices of power/knowledge to make visible the 
workings of power/knowledge, as it constitutes the subject/object. I take up a 
poststructuralist analytical stance in this autoethnographic study to unpack the 
constituted and fluid nature of my identity, and investigate how discourses operate 
to create a subjugated self, or object of discourse. This study, therefore, attempts 
to, to quote Foucault, uncover the “way a human being turns him- or herself into a 
subject … Thus it is not power, but the subject, which is the general theme of my 
research” (Foucault, 1982, pp. 208-209). This approach opens the possibility for 
me to move towards agency and explore the taken-for-granted nature of 
discourses that constitute me, while I proactively and consciously take steps act to 
create my-self as a work of art (see Foucault, 1994c).  
 
In this autoethnography, I see ‘Paula the subject’ as the focus of my research. This 
study is concerned with unpacking the effects of the following discursive strands 
in the shaping of my identity: the educational, the scientific/biomedical, and 
neoliberalist/capitalist. I choose a poststructuralist approach to deconstruct the 
effects of these discourses that have informed me, my self, and my ways of being 
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in the world. I am interested in the positions made available to me by discourses, 
especially in relation to work and the positions I took up within these.  
 
In this chapter, I present and discuss a selection of key poststructuralist tools and 
concepts that make possible a deconstructive analysis of the autobiographical 
stories presented in chapters four and five. I undertake this analysis to uncover, 
moment-by-moment, my taking up of, and resisting invitations to, particular 
discursive subject positions, as I am interested in tracking the movement or 
migration of my identity (see White, 1995), over time. I conduct this exercise to 
create a greater sense of awareness of the ways in which I have been subjugated 
and objectivised by discourses. This awareness makes it possible for me to choose 
to position my self differently and take up agentic positions, and resist invitations 
from compassion fatigue, and becoming stuck in blame or failure. In this thesis, I 
take up a position to trouble the effects of discourse (Davies, 2000b) on my self to 
open up space for the formation of self as event (Jackson, 2010, p. 583).  
 
The focus of this research shifts from discovering who I am to an examination of 
the effects of subjugation (or the discursive production of myself as 
object/subject) on my sense of identity, and my resistance to the positions made 
available by discourses. To this end, I unpack the stories, and search for traces of 
what was favoured at the exclusion of everything else, and what was omitted or 
covered over.  
 
This study takes the form of a microanalysis of the operations of practices of 
power/knowledge at the level of my individual self – to uncover how I was 
formed as a subject. Davies et al. (2002), state: “Foucault installs the subject as 
one who can be aware of the effects of subjection and disrupt or refuse its 
apparent imperatives” (p. 292). The aim of this study is for my self to move and 
re-position within discourses through an unpacking or troubling of the practices of 
power/knowledge. This will hopefully bring about a movement to a more 
“empowered and aware position” (Weingarten, 2000, p. 397).  
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The structure of this chapter 
In the first section of this chapter I discuss power and its relationship to 
knowledge, and how this relationship links to the formation of the subject. I touch 
on Foucault (1972, 1977, 1980) and Butler’s (1995) ideas of mastery and 
submission through which the subject is constituted by discourse. I discuss the 
concept of agency and provide a brief overview of the ways that Foucault (1985) 
considers the practice of the constituting of the continuously emerging self, 
namely subjection and subjectivation. I then highlight the Derridean (1976) 
practice of deconstruction, and explain Davies’s (2000b) development of this or 
the “troubling” (p. 14) of the boundaries between binaries generated by 
discourses, and indicate the relevance of this for this thesis. Next, I present 
White’s (2002) failure conversation map, and highlight the importance of 
analysing modern power/discourses, especially in light of how blame for any 
failure of modern power is shifted to the individual. Finally, I discuss a selection 
of Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) theoretical concepts such as, molar, molecular, 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, smooth and striated space, lines of 
flight, becoming and difference, becoming-woman, and faciality, and explain their 
relevance for this study of “self as event” (Jackson, 2010, p. 583). 
 
Power/knowledge 
Foucault (1980) considers that there is an inseparable relation between power and 
knowledge. Knowledge is produced by power, and power is produced by 
knowledge, and the power/knowledge relation is “embedded in all human 
relations” (Markula & Pringle, 2006, p. 146). This means that the person is always 
“part of the power relations and [is] a user of power” (Markula & Pringle, 2006, 
p. 146). Because the workings of power are hidden they are given the status of 
truth and are linked to particular knowledges. Foucault investigates this relation 
between power and knowledge, as he is interested in how they shape the 
individual. He argues that the power/knowledge relation produces normalising 
judgements that form a self, relationships with others, and ways of being in the 
world. Power/knowledge operates on and through the person through the 
internalising, or enfolding of, these normalising judgments that are based on 
modern power’s taken-for-granted, and privileged knowledges of life and ways of 
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being. This means that individuals shape their lives, bodies and gestures according 
to taken-for-granted truths.  
 
From a Foucauldian (1985) perspective, an examination of power focuses on how 
power operates, rather than who has power and who does not. Foucault (1980) 
provides the tools to uncover how the subject is constituted by discourse and 
simultaneously exercises power. A Foucauldian (1980) mode of analysis aims to 
problematise the limitations of the binaries offered by discourses and focuses on 
the availability of alternative positions and possibilities. This mode of analysis 
does not scrutinise power at the macro level but uncovers the invisible operations 
of power through an analysis of everyday interpersonal practices where power 
“becomes capillary, that is, in its more regional and local forms and institutions” 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 96). Applying this mode of enquiry involves discovering the 
workings of practices of power/knowledge as they occur between people “and in 
the relations between people and knowledge systems – or patterns of discourse” 
(Davies, 2000a, p.18). Foucault (1994d), explains that truth games are produced 
by the normalising judgement of power/knowledge and describes them as:  “a set 
of rules by which truth is produced…it is a set of procedures that lead to a certain 
result, which, on the basis of its principles and rules of procedure, may be 
considered valid or invalid, winning or losing” (1994d, p. 297). Because 
normalising judgements are perceived by the subject to have the status of truth, 
the subject produces his or her within the range of positions, or parameters, that 
determine appropriate behaviour determined by the expectations of normalising 
judgement.  
 
Foucault (1977, 1980, 1985,) uses Bentham’s panopticon as a model to explain 
how the individual willingly comes to internalise the gaze of normalising 
judgement and bring him- or herself into alignment with the striations of 
power/knowledge. However, because this technique of power/knowledge is 
hidden, the individual experiences it as fulfilment and liberation. This means that 
power/knowledge positions people to embrace their own subjugation and to relate 
to their own lives through techniques of power/knowledge (Foucault, 1977). 
However, Foucault argues that games of truth and power/knowledge do not 
oppress the subject, instead they provide multiple ways for the subject to produce 
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him- or her self. Because “the self is not given to us” (Foucault, 1994c, p. 262), 
identity is something that can be actively produced by the subject. Foucault’s 
(1985) ideas on ethics and the formation of the subject are central to this thesis, 
and I discuss these further in chapter three.  
 
Discourses 
For the purposes of this thesis the term ‘discourse’ refers to a “multi-faceted 
public process” (Davies & Harré, 1990, p. 35), involving “meanings, metaphors, 
representations, images, stories, statements and so on that in some way produce a 
particular version of events” (Burr, 2003, p. 64) and thus, claim to be the truth. 
Discourses can also be defined as invisible sets of rules for living and navigating 
our way in the world, and as such they are preferred, or dominant, sets of 
knowledges which are power-full. However, discourses are for Foucault (1978), 
as “both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-
block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy” 
(Foucault, 1978, p. 101). Foucault (1994b) argues that this resistance is a 
necessary ethical practice of self-formation, inasmuch as being concerned with the 
self is a political activity. This means that while identity is a product of 
discourses, the individual can also have an effect on the social world and be 
involved in generating, modifying and perpetuating the life of the social 
(Foucault, 1980). While discourses are not apparent to us, we cannot exist without 
them as they constitute us. There are many discourses that shape the subject; as 
Davies writes, “what ‘I am’ is constituted or ‘storied’ through multiple discourses, 
some of them more intractable than others, some with more immediate and 
evident effects than others” (1998, p. 139). This means that the discursive scripts 
that are made available to us, and which we draw upon to tell our stories, are 
limited to, and demarcated by, the rules and expectations of those discourses.  
 
The mechanism by which discourse transmits knowledge is through language. 
Davies and Harré (1990) argue that discourses are an “institutionalized use of 
language and language-like sign systems” (p. 45). However, because discourses 
are “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 
1972, p. 49), they are more than language and speech.  
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Mastery and submission 
Foucault (1977) conceived of mastery as a covert strategy used by the hegemony 
to maintain the status quo of power/knowledge. For a subject to achieve mastery 
in a discourse, and to function in the social world, s/he has to first become 
subjected by the discourse, and Foucault (1972) argues that a sense of self is 
created as mastery of discourses occurs. Individuals become “vehicles of power” 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 98), who unquestioningly perform and perpetuate normative 
and taken for granted self-regulating and restrictive practices of self “that limit 
choice and control doubts” (Brown, 2007b, p. 107). In his treatise on Foucault, 
Deleuze (1988) explains that Foucault is haunted by the theme of the double, or 
how the outside becomes enfolded into the subject. Deleuze states,  
the double is never a projection of the interior; on the contrary, it is an 
interiorization of the outside. It is not a doubling of the One, but a 
redoubling of the Other. It is not a reproduction of the Same, but a repetition 
of the Different. It is not the emanation of an ‘I’, but something that places 
immanence an always other or a Non-self. It is never the other who is a 
double in the doubling process, it is a self that lives me as the double of the 
other: I do not encounter myself on the outside, I find the other in me. (p. 
98) 
To master a discourse requires the individual to submit to the discourse. Butler 
(1995) explains that the more the subject masters a practice, 
the more fully subjection is achieved. Submission and mastery take place 
simultaneously, and it is this paradoxical simultaneity that constitutes the 
ambivalence of submission. Where one might expect submission to consist 
in a yielding to an externally imposed dominant order, and to be marked by 
a loss of control and mastery, it is paradoxically marked by mastery itself… 
neither submission nor mastery is performed by a subject; the lived 
simultaneity of submission as mastery, and mastery as submission, is the 
condition of possibility for the subject itself. (pp. 45-46)  
The achievement of mastery through submission to the discourse makes it 
possible for the subject to act within whatever discourse s/he has mastered. 
However, this sense of autonomy “conceals our interconnectedness and 
dependence” (Claiborne, Cornforth, Davies, Milligan,  & White, 2009, p. 52). It is 
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through this mechanism of mastery and submission that the self is recruited into 
“practices of regulation, hoping to demonstrate to others and themselves their 
success at self-control and management, which holds significant cultural value, 
admiration, and reward” (Brown, 2007b, p. 106). Through the mastery of 
normative discourses the individual is rewarded with increased status and 
autonomy, yet becomes subjugated by the discourses in return. 
 
Agency 
While we are never free from discourse, a subject who acts with agency is aware 
of the shifting nature of positions within discourse and can, according to Foucault 
(1985, 1986, 1994a), take up a position of greater agency in the face of the 
subjugation by normalising judgement. Brown (2007a) argues that space for 
agency is created by: “Points of resistance [which] are everywhere in the power 
network…this leaves space for agency, space for counter discourses…discourses, 
then, like power, can be seen as both constituting and constraining” (p. 5). 
According to Davies (1991), stepping into agency means that an individual can  
resist, subvert, and change the discourses … through which [he/she] … is 
being constituted. It is the freedom to recognise multiple readings such that no 
discursive practice, or positioning within it by powerful others, can capture 
and control one’s identity. (p. 51)  
While a subject can resist position calls by discourses that constitute them, the 
degree of possible agency differs from person to person. This is because agency is 
not a destination, but is in a constant state of flux, as it is related to the person’s 
social position, and the nature of his or her relationships. Davies (1991) argues 
that agency is “fragmented, transitory, a discursive position that can be occupied 
in one discourse simultaneously with its non-occupation in another. Within 
current ways of speaking it is readily obtainable for some and an almost 
inaccessible positioning for others” (Davies, 1991, p. 52). According to Foucault 
(1982), depending on the degree of agency that an individual is able to move into, 
there are two ways that the subject is constituted by discourse. If the person is 
unaware as to how discourse constitutes him/her, s/he unwittingly takes up a 
subjugated subject/object position. On the other hand, if a person is aware of the 
position calls being made by discourses, s/he can take steps towards agency to 
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accept, refuse or resist these position calls. Foucault (1982) describes this 
conscious stepping into agency as subjectivation. 
 
The concept of subjectivation 
While the subject is acted upon by discourse, s/he is can step into agency and take 
up, resist, and affect discourses. Foucault (1978) makes the case that technologies, 
or practices of the self, can be undertaken to free the person from 
power/knowledge. The central question of freeing the self “constitutes a moral 
problem: how will one practice one’s liberty? How can one practice freedom?” 
(Markula & Pringle, 2006, p. 147). Drawing on the Stoics’ form of ethical care of 
the self, Foucault (1994c) describes the subject’s process of using, refusing, 
choosing, and /or resisting their constitution by modern power as the ethical 
practice of constituting the self, or subjectivation. For Foucault (1994c), an 
individual who is subjectivated is engaged in an ethical process of creating him- 
or herself as a work of art. St. Pierre (2000) describes this process as 
poststructuralism’s “double move” where the “subject …exhibits agency as it 
constructs itself by taking up available discourses and cultural practices and …at 
the same time, is subjected, forced into subjectivity by those same discourses and 
practices” (p. 502). This means that forms of knowledge are transmitted through 
discourse and people have the possibility of stepping into agency and speaking or 
storying themselves into preferred positions and ways of being. I discuss 
subjectivation further in chapter three. 
 
Deconstruction or the troubling of boundaries between binaries 
Deconstruction refers to the practice of attending the taken-for-granted 
assumptions and binaries (such as good and evil, male and female) of influential 
discourses that form the foundation of our conversations, behaviours, and 
expressions of emotion (Derrida, 1992a; White, 1997). Derrida’s (1976) 
deconstructive analysis involves placing a concept or idea, usually the dominant 
concept from a binary, under erasure, or sous rature (p. xvii) to make visible the 
power of the binary contained within the concept or idea. Sous rature means to 
conceive or write the word representing the idea or concept, and then cross it out. 
This practice allows both the concept and that which it is not to be analysed 
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together simultaneously. Davies (1993) contends that making visible invisible 
discourses is like disattending “the pane of glass in order to look at the view out 
the window, so we generally disattend discourse. It is not until the glass fractures 
or breaks, for example, that we focus differently” (p. 153). This deconstructive 
practice does not destroy the binaries of power/knowledge, rather, it undoes “the 
very notions of identity and hierarchy” (Sampson, 1989, p. 8). Undoing discourses 
is not about opposing them, instead it explores what they gloss over, or suppress, 
and opens them up for critique. Burr (2003) writes, “the way that discourses 
construct our experience can be examined by ‘deconstructing’ these texts, taking 
them apart and showing how they work to present us with a particular vision of 
the world, and thus enabling us to challenge it” (p. 18). Davies (2000b) prefers to 
take the smaller and more manageable step to “trouble” (p. 14) the boundaries 
between binaries rather than deconstruct them, as she contends that the power of 
the binaries that constitute discourses are too powerful to place under erasure. 
Davies (2000b) states that:  
too many readers of deconstructive texts take deconstruction to mean a 
dismantling that obliterates the binaries and boundaries between them. 
Binaries are not so easily dismantled, and the deconstructive work often 
can do no more than draw attention to the binaries and to their constitutive 
force. (p. 14) 
Troubling, from this perspective, can be used as a way of undoing how 
power/knowledge shapes an object/subject of power/knowledge, or discourse. 
This makes visible, and frees up, the position-taking that is possible, which 
increases the possibilities of agency to take steps towards a preferred identity 
claim (see Davies & Harré, 1990).  
 
Personal failure  
White’s (2002) ideas around the failure of what he calls “modern power” (p. 35) 
are founded on Foucault’s (1973, 1978, 1980) work on power/knowledge and the 
producing of an ethical self. I discuss the ethical concept of the care of the self 
and its implications for political action at greater length in chapter three. White 
(2002) views these systems of modern power relations, in which people fashion 
their own lives through the disciplining of the self, as being internalized practices 
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of  “normalising judgement of persons, rather than moral judgement” (p. 57). 
Identities are formed within the context of what a particular culture deems socially 
appropriate, which means that if a person fails to meet these social expectations 
then White’s (2002) maps of personal failure offer a way of exploring personal 
failure to reveal the failure of modern power. This provides the possibility for 
movement towards a preferred identity.  
 
For White (2002), the phenomenon of personal failure is closely linked to the 
growth of modern systems of social control, or discourses, and reflects a failure of 
a “particular system of power, the existence of which is dependent upon its 
success at enlisting people in the shaping and disciplining of their identities 
according to these norms” (p. 46). The experience of personal failure can also be 
conceived of as a person’s refusal to submit to modern power and, through this 
refusal, highlights the partial failure of modern power. Brown (2007b) states 
“[w]hen notions of failure and success are tied to individual efforts of will and 
discipline, they effectively mask self-regulation as cultural practices of power” (p. 
108). Failure by the individual to manage themselves according to these rules 
provides strong invitations of self-blame. The discursive practices being shaped 
by the discourses may well be invisible to the person. White argues that an 
analysis of personal failure provides an opportunity to explore these as acts of 
refusal so that “modern power might be identified and become richly known” 
(2002, p. 46).  
 
Remanufacturing identity 
White (2002) draws on Foucault’s (1994a) work, which explores aesthetics of 
living outside of normalising judgements, to propose that the manufacturing or 
constituting of “identity in the history of western culture can be employed in the 
structuring of therapeutic practices that contribute to the remanufacture of 
identity” (p. 70).  White (2002) argues that experiences of personal failure can be 
used to effectively remanufacture identity through the identifying and reframing 
of self- and relationship-forming activities that, from one perspective, speak of 
personal failure, but from another, speak of a resistance to, and refusal of, 
normalising judgments. For White (2002), these experiences of failure can be 
harnessed and developed to “contribute to the further development and 
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appreciation of diversity in lifestyle and [which] simultaneously have the effect of 
moderating the dispersal and celluarisation of lives that is the hallmark of modern 
power” (p. 70). From White’s (2002) viewpoint, personal failure can be described 
as acts of refusal or resistance that do not “come ‘out of the blue’…these acts of 
refusal might represent alternative identity projects that contribute to options for 
people in the remanufacture of their identities” (p. 57). This means that the 
individual is able to take up or refuse position calls from one discourse, or one set 
of discourses, and take up a position offered by another discourse.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari: Points of departure  
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) work focuses on how desire works, and who for. 
Goodchild (1996) states that “[t]he politics of desire is the sole purpose of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s thought; the social unconscious is its sole field of inquiry” 
(p. 5). From this perspective, desire is the mechanism that allows the individual to 
function in the world and is the engine that drives the becoming of the 
continuously evolving self. Jackson and Mazzei (2012) explain that: 
Desire’s production is active, becoming, transformative. It produces out of a 
multiplicity of forces which form the assemblage. We desire, not because 
we lack something that we do not have, but because of the productive force 
of intensities and connections of desires. (p. 86) 
Using the metaphor of an orchid and its relationship with a wasp, Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987) illustrate how desire makes possible the wasp and the orchid’s 
experience of a mutually symbiotic exchange in relationship.  
 
The desire forms the basis of Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) concepts of 
becoming, and becoming-woman, as it is through symbiotic relationship, or the 
two parties entering a rhizome together, that becoming is made possible. Deleuze 
and Guattari (1987) explain that the 
orchid deterritorialises by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; but the 
wasp reterritorializes on that image. The wasp is nevertheless 
deterritorialized, becoming a piece in the orchid’s reproductive apparatus. 
But it reterritorializes the orchid by transporting its pollen. Wasp and 
orchid, as heterogeneous elements, form a rhizome…At the same time, 
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something else entirely is going on: not imitation at all but a capture of 
code, surplus value of code, an increase in valence, a veritable becoming, a 
becoming-wasp of the orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp. (p.10)  
The transforming identity is, therefore, produced through the act of desiring. As 
desire is the force that brings together the wasp and orchid (see Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 293) and makes it possible for them to take off on a line of 
flight together, to become other than they are. Evidence of this can be seen in 
people’s acts of creativity, change and resistance.  
 
Desire produces the preconditions for transformation/becoming, for each partner, 
through relationship. For Deleuze (1990), we also become other to previous 
versions of ourselves through relationship. Deleuze (1990) states that, “[t]he 
actual is not what we are, but rather what we become, what we are in the midst of 
becoming, in other words, it is the Other, our becoming-other” (pp. 190-191). In 
short, becomings are expressions of desire, for change or difference, and this can 
be applied to social justice or politics. Goodchild (1996) argues that a politics of 
desire focuses on breaking 
down the dichotomy between desire and interest, so that people can begin 
to desire, think, and act in their own interests, and become interested in 
their own desires... Theory becomes an attempt to ‘think otherwise’, to 
explore new kinds of thoughts and relations, new kinds of subjectivity and 
society. (p. 6) 
Because Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) work is predicated on this idea of desire, 
they only write about things they desire to break, such as power/knowledge 
structures like capitalism, or about things they love, such as cinema, art or 
liberation. Goodchild (1996) argues that the point of their work is to free up 
society, and create a version of it that values “multiplicity, desire and creativity” 
(p. 42). Deleuze and Guattari (1987) stress the importance of the ways that we 
think in producing lines of power/knowledge or discourse. For them, the only way 
that the effects of power can be addressed is if people change the way they think. I 
call upon Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts to disrupt old ways of thinking, and to 
“engage in life as a series of encounters that unfold out of the not-yet-known” 
(Davies, 2009a, p. 13). Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy maintains that living is a 
continual process of experimentation, a seeking of “new foldings, refoldings, and 
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unfoldings” (May, 2005, p. 25) that have the potential to open out into a 
multiplicity of possible futures and becomings for the individual.  
 
This quest I undertake involves positioning myself in a space which embraces 
“openness to relationality, to an on-going process of becoming…[to] a new kind 
of flexibility, not externally driven, but responsive, relational, artistic and life-
giving – insofar as life is generated through a continual Deleuzian unfolding of 
thought and practice” (Davies, 2009a, p. 4). The creative and imaginative process 
I undertake is one that pushes boundaries and enables “reflexive, analytic and 
ethical awareness” (Davies, 2009a, p. 5). Such a process invites me to position 
myself in new ways in relation to what Deleuze and Guattri call the 
‘schizophrenia’, of capitalism. By undertaking the artistic process of 
autoethnography, I can take up, critique and resist the discourses of capitalism and 
neoliberalism in order to transform them into something else (Davies 2009a, p. 5). 
For Davies (2009a), shifting away from the rules of neoliberalism, where highly 
individualized subjects compete for limited resources while the technologies of 
government work on them to become productive (Foucault, 2003) invites an 
ethical life, a life not limited by the already known. 
 
Next, I outline key Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts that I draw upon in this thesis to 
reveal and disrupt that which produces my identity: becoming-woman, becoming, 
molar; molecular; smooth and striated space; lines of flight; and 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation; The analysis of the short stories in 
chapter five is an attempt to think of self as an event (Jackson, 2010, p. 583); to 
dig down through layers of meaning that became folded into my identity through 
small movements in relationship with others in order to locate moments of 




According to Deleuze and Guattari (1987), molar forms are discourses and other 
discursive structures. The world is shaped along and by molar lines. These 
dominant forms govern the formation of identity (Jackson, 2010), and operate 
within the constraints of what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) label “striated space” 
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(pp. 492-499). Striated space is divisive and controls, restricts and divides 
everything into binary opposites. Molar lines of force “reduce the range of 
connections a body can make with the world around it; diminishing its potential 
for difference and becoming-other” (Hickey-Moody & Malins, 2007, p. 153). 
Because the molar functions to both limit and provide the conditions for being 
accepted by society, it operates on identity to produce rigidity and a sense of 
constraint in the person. However, molar lines are necessary as they make molar 
identities possible (May, 2005, p. 127). This is because molar lines provide the 
structure that makes interacting with the world and relationships with other people 
possible. In this way, the molar plays an important role in the opening up of 
possibilities for new lines of flight of creativity and experimentation (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987).  
 
Molecular lines 
Deleuzo-Guattarian (1987) philosophy includes key geographical concepts of 
space and movement and they utilise the concept of deterritorialisation as the 
molecular movement by which the individual resists, escapes or departs from a 
given territory (striated molar space). These small movements, or “bends” away 
from the rule, (Winslade, 2009, p. 344), challenge the territory of the molar. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987), describe the small movement of resistance away 
from molar territory as a “deterritorialization” (1987, pp. 345-346) from the 
molar. However, the molecular line is usually recaptured by the territory of the 
molar and is then “reterritorialized”, (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 508) or 
recaptured back into the familiar territory of the molar. This means that we never 
fully escape the influence of discourses. 
 
Deterrorialisation and reterritorialisation: 
Deterritorialisation is change and the mining of possibilities for becoming. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) suggest that this process can lead to physical, mental 
or spiritual transformation. Sometimes reterritorialisation does not always involve 
a return to the original territory, but can result in change in the form of a new 
recombination of the old deterritorialised elements into a new way of being and a 
new set of relations. This process is artistic at core as it creates new terrains and 
opportunities for identities to evolve.  
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Smooth space 
For Deleuze and Guattari (1987), smooth space is entirely different to restricting 
space of molar forms. It blurs boundaries, and opens up the possibility for 
transformation of identity and the creative to occur. Davies (2009b) writes that in 
smooth space anything is possible: 
Castles can become mountains, lines of fault can open new paths; the 
direction is not set. One is no longer limited by a preconceived idea of the 
self, but immersed in a moment of becoming – folding, unfolding, being 
enfolded, enfolding earth, light, air, and other beings. (p. 23) 
Hickey-Moody and Malins 2007) describe smooth spaces as “those in which 
movement is less regulated or controlled, and where bodies can interact – and 
transform themselves – in endlessly different ways” (p. 11). Becoming 
deterritorialised in smooth space opens up the possibility for new lines of flight. 
 
Lines of flight 
According to Deleuze and Guattari (1987) lines of flight occur in smooth space in 
relation with other/s, either animate or inanimate. The line of flight that the wasp 
and the orchid take off on together transforms them both. This is because a line of 
flight represents a deterritorialisation of the molar and molecular. Once one 
occurs, it changes forever whatever it comes in contact with. While lines of flight 
are available to anyone at any time, they are often not taken up due to the 
striations of discursive, and normalising, lines of force or power. Deleuze (1994) 
states: “[w]hat’s interesting, even in a person, are the lines that make them up, or 
they make up, or take, or create” (p. 33).  
 
Becoming and difference 
Central to Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy is the idea that life evolves 
continuously through a process of movement/continual process of becoming 
(Davies, 2009a; Mazzei & Jackson, 2012; Winslade, 2009). According to Davies 
(2009a), Deleuze & Guatarri’s idea of differenciation, or becoming, refers to a 
continuous process of subjects and objects becoming different from themselves in, 
and through, relationship with other beings. Williams (2003, p. 60) points out, for 
Deleuze “real difference is a matter of how things become different, how they 
evolve and continue to evolve beyond the boundaries of the sets they have been 
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distributed into.” This means that differenciation, or becoming, is a movement of 
escape for the individual that opens the possibility for a new way of being.  
 
Becoming is a line of flight which “passes between points, it comes up through 
the middle” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p. 293). Jackson (2010) suggests that 
becoming “is [also] the movement through a unique event that produces 
experimentation and change” (p. 581). Becoming happens in the middle of molar 
structures, within relationships, and works to dissolve binaries that organise 
bodies, experiences, institutions, and histories and the molecular is the effect of 
this breaking apart. For Massumi (1992), becoming is “directional (away from 
molarity), but is not directed (no one body or will can pilot it)” (p. 103). Massumi 
(1992, p. 103) warns that becoming “cannot be adequately described. If it could, it 
would already be what it is becoming, in which case it wouldn’t be becoming at 
all”. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) use the metaphor of a wasp and an orchid to 
illustrate how the desire for a symbiotic or mutually beneficial relationship brings 
about a line of flight and transformation, or becoming different, in relation to the 
previous version of self, and each another. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) reiterate 
that: 
The line of becoming that unites the wasp and the orchid produces a shared 
deterritorialization: of the wasp, in that it becomes a liberated piece of the 
orchid’s reproductive system, but also of the orchid, in that it becomes the 
object of an orgasm in the wasp, also liberated from its own reproduction. 
(p. 293)  
This means that through their relationship and interaction both the wasp and the 
orchid take off on a line of flight and, in the process, each becomes different. This 
intersecting and becoming different occurs in the smooth space between them – as 
a direct result of their connection. From a Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective, 
becoming through relationship opens up the possibility to move into unfamiliar 
territory, in other words to become “difference” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 83), or 
different in relation. Becoming different in relation changes more than the two 




Deleuze and Guattari (1987) invent the concept of becoming-woman to exemplify 
this idea of becoming. Becoming-woman does not refer to becoming a woman as 
in the human development sense. Rather, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) explain 
that “all becomings begin with and pass through becoming-woman. It is the key to 
all the other becomings” (p. 277). Through the mechanism of transforming 
together on a line of flight, both the wasp and the orchid become becoming- 
woman. Becoming-woman is, therefore, a line of flight in a continual and fluid 
process, which destabilises and breaks apart the binaries of molar structures as she 
moves through them. This means that any two parties on a transformational line 
of flight together are becoming-woman.  
 
Faciality 
For Deleuze and Guattari (1987) the concept of ‘faciality’ or the white wall/black 
hole system, forms the basis of the organisation of current society. They argue 
that the appearance of the face is not only how an individual is recognised, but 
that it determines a person’s place and function in society. The face is recruited in 
the service of capitalist culture to sell products, including media products. 
Goodchild (1996) states that this is because 
[c]apitalist culture is largely concerned with the investment of desire in the 
production, recording, and consumption of faces. The capitalist subject 
wishes to produce a face of his or her own, to be recognized and acclaimed; 
films television, newspapers, and magazines operate less as ‘media’ than as 
machines for the production and recording of faces; the consumer gains an 
immediate pleasure from the recognition and consumption of a famous face 
by virtue of the numinous quality of ‘fame’ attaching to it. (p. 107)   
The faciality machine constrains human experience and organises economy and 
power (Deleuze & Guattari 1987, p. 175). It limits the field of possibilities, and 
defines what we are capable of seeing, doing and being. Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987) argue that the faciality machine “performs the facialization of the whole 
body and all its surroundings and objects, and the landscapification of all worlds 
and milieus” (p. 181). They contend that even though a realm of possibility opens 
up each time an individual encounters another being or object, the face operates to 
shut down that possibility. Rushton (2002) explains that when one enters this 
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realm of possibility one enters a realm of infinite 
possible connections, of possible confrontations, expectations, and 
creations; in short, [one]…enter[s] into possibility itself… This experience 
of circumscribing and of curtailing possibility is the experience of the face. 
(p. 228) 
However, when one encounters another face, the infinite possibilities are reduced 
from infinite to the finite, “it is the channel that both connects the infinite with the 
finite and separates the infinite from the finite; it reduces infinite possibility to 
finite so, it unleashes potential” (Rushton, 2002. p. 228). This means that as 
faciality produces the subject, it also produces the world that the subject is able to 
move into and through. This world and subject that are made possible by the 
faciality machine are predicated on fear, which is capitalised on by various 
institutions and discourses, such as neoliberalism and the mass media. It is 
virtually impossible to escape the faciality machine, and any lines of flight away 
are blocked, and any deterritorialisations are reterritorialised.   
 
Coda 
The aim of this study is to develop a greater degree of self-reflexivity. By 
troubling discourses (Davies, 2000b) and by conducting Foucauldian-inspired, 
and Deleuzo-Guattarian analyses of my short autobiographical stories, I hope to 
uncover and trouble the boundaries of the binaries of the absent yet implicit 
discursive working of subjugation, and seek sparkling moments of subjectivation, 
or agency. I draw upon the poststructuralist ideas and concepts presented in this 
chapter to discover the ways in which my identity has been created by and 
through discourse, and its attendant normalising judgement acting on my body, 
soul, thoughts and behaviour. I undertake this exercise as a thinking being 
(Foucault, 1994b) to discover how my self becomes an object of knowledge, so as 
to become a more agentic version of my self who can pick and choose, to a 
greater extent, positions that will facilitate a preferred version of my self. The next 
chapter discusses the ways in which Foucault theorises these practices of the 
individual acting upon him or herself, or technologies of the self (Foucault, 
1994b).  
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Chapter Three: A poststructural autoethnography 
 
The aim of this autoethnography 
The aim of this autoethnography is twofold: firstly, I investigate how my identity 
was subjugated, or constituted, by key discourses within specific historical 
contexts; and secondly, I hope to engage in the agentic movement toward a 
preferred, ethical identity claim for my self. I undertake this writing as an entry 
point to a technology of the self, or care of the self (see Foucault, 1994b). 
Through analysing the short stories about the key events in my journey of identity 
re-formulation through a poststructuralist lens, I uncover the workings of 
educational, capitalist and neoliberal discourses and this is the ground from which 
I depart, to find for myself an elusive ever-changing identity. Foucault (1994b) 
states: 
Self is a reflexive pronoun, and it has two meanings. Auto means ‘the 
same’ but it also conveys the notion of identity…Departing from what 
ground shall I find my identity? (p. 230). 
Butler (1995) explains that “the critique of the subject is not a negation or 
repudiation of the subject, but, rather, it is a way of interrogating its construction 
as a pregiven or foundationalist premise” (p. 42). Through this writing, I search 
for an in-between space of becoming in relation I order to trouble the boundaries 
between binary of self and other, “where self and other merge and divide” 
(Gannon, 2003, p. 131). Taking personal stories as its starting point, this study 
weaves theoretical texts to “author-ize different writing 
technologies…[to]…foreground the dialogic relationship between the self and his 
or her tenuous and particular social/cultural/historical locations” (Gannon, 2006, 
p. 477). The position I take is that all the stories I present in this thesis are 
“partial, incomplete, and always being told and re-membered” (Jackson & 
Mazzei, 2012, p. 3). I see the writing and analysis process I do in this study as a 
“production of knowledge that might emerge as a creation out of chaos” (Jackson 
& Mazzei, 2012, p. 2). In this autoethnography, I write about uncomfortable 
moments as it helps to create a deconstructed counter-story. In the analysis of my 
autoethnographic writing, I take my lead from Davies et al., (2006, p. 96) who 
search for mo(ve)ments, especially moments of instability and inequality, as it is 
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in these moments that the production of the self becomes apparent. In my writing 
I also draw upon a number of poetic and experimental techniques used by 
poststructural autoethnographers to trouble the constructedness of experience, and 
disrupt the borders of the binaries of discourse (Davies, 2000b).  
 
A poststructuralist approach to autoethnography therefore, does not rely upon, or 
try to destroy the self; rather, its aim is to make visible the constructed nature of 
the discursively produced self. To achieve this troubling of binaries, a 
poststructural autoethnography attempts to “destabilize the authority of the self 
who writes and knows himself or herself as a discrete and autonomous subject” 
(Gannon, 2006, p. 477). Writing in this vein searches for “traces and unreliable 
fragments” (Gannon, 2006, p. 483) of an elusive self. Barthes (1977) explains that 
this writing of the self is no guarantee of an objective re-presentation of the self:  
Text can recount nothing: it takes my body elsewhere, far from my 
imaginary person, toward a kind of memoryless speech of the People, of 
the non-subjective mass (or of the generalized subject), even if I am still 
separated from it by my way of writing. (p.4) 
Although memories become enfolded into the body of the subject, these memories 
cannot, from a poststructuralist perspective, be relied upon as the whole truth. 
This task of writing the self into being is a juggling act or (im)possible challenge 
that requires a continual process of self-reflexivity to defer and displace the self. 
According to Kamler and Thompson (2006), a reflexive approach makes 
the subject and the object of an activity the same…[this]…reflexive practice 
uses both the personal and discursive ‘I’. Reflexivity means looking for the 
social in the individual account, asking how particular events, categories and 
assumptions might have been produced through discourse, culture, political 
affiliations, and/or social practice. (p. 66) 
Therefore, the stories-of-self that I present in this thesis cannot be relied upon to 
tell the whole, or even part, of the truth of the experiences they recount, or re-
present. This is because I only become available to my self through the process of 
writing.  Derrida & Ewald (cited in Gannon, 2006) state that:  
The self does not exist, it is not present to itself until that which engages it 
in this way, and which is not it. There is not a constituted subject which 
engages itself in writing at a given moment for some reason or another. It 
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exists through writing, given (donné) by the other; born(né)…through 
being given (donné), delivered, offered and betrayed all at one and the 
same time. (pp. 484-485) 
This means that writing about the self, and relationships with others, helps to form 
the elusive self. By adopting a poststructural approach to autoethnography, I 
choose to move into a position where, rather than trying to write the truth of my 
self, I can instead conceive of my self as a multiplicity of earlier selves that fan 
back over time. In this work I move into a position to trouble the binary that 
separates my one self from my earlier and other selves. I do this to conceive of a 
self as an event (Jackson, 2010, p. 583), as a becoming in relation with others, and 
through the in-folding of discourses.  
 
As I have earlier stated, the overarching purpose of this work is to work with 
philosophy to negotiate with, and seek the space between the boundaries of such 
discourses as the educational, biomedical/scientific, and the capitalist and 
neoliberalist. I undertake this work to search for traces of “lines of flight, that are 
necessary from a Deleuzian perspective, for evolution, for life itself” (Davies 
2009a, p. 3). Burr (1995) suggests that the first step towards personal change 
within this framework of discursive positioning 
is to recognise the discourses (and the positions provided by them) that are 
currently shaping our subjectivity. Such a recognition can be beneficial in 
itself, by re-locating problems away from an intra-psychic domain and into 
a societal one. (p. 150)  
Therefore, this study takes the form of a new way of thinking-in-detail for me, or 
microanalysis of the operations of power/knowledge, at the level of the self, 
within specific socio-cultural contexts encapsulated in the short autobiographical 
stories I have written. Goodchild (1996) argues that “the only way in which 
repressive structures of society can be removed is by changing the way in which 
we think, and hence the way in which power operates in society” (p. 106). By 
challenging the taken-for-grantedness of the binary operations of discourses, I 
hope to bring about a movement to a more empowered and aware position for me 
(see Weingarten, 2000, pp. 396-397) to facilitate a shift in position in relation to 
particular discourses, and illustrate the fluid nature of the poststructural self as 
well as the possibility of “migration of identity” (White, 1995, p. 99). I use 
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Foucault’s (1994b) ideas about the ethical production of the self, or technologies 
of the self and theories pertaining to technologies of power/knowledge to unpack 
the effects of discourses on me. For Foucault (1994b), technologies of the self, 
permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, 
a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, 
conduct, and ways of being, so as to transform themselves in order to 
attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or 
immortality. (p. 225)  
For Davies et al. (2006), transformation of the self is a messy process of 
decomposition and recomposition as the individual is never outside of discourse. 
They argue that the  
challenge of the poststructuralist transformative project is twofold: 
- to see the new questions posed by Foucault and other poststructuralist 
writers, along with their conceptual repertoire, enable us to see about 
what we are now; and 
- in making visible what we are now, to develop strategies (conceptual 
and practical) for making a radical break with current forms of 
domination, for imagining a new kind of subject. (p. 90) 
In the process of writing and analysing my autobiographical stories I see what I 
am now by making transparent a transformation of my self – and a migration of 
my identity (White, 1995, p.99). This becoming in relation is what Jackson (2010, 
p. 583) describes as becoming as an event. She states: “think of the wasp and 
orchid again, and remember that becoming happened in the event of connection, 
in a threshold. We can think of the girl as an event that connects micro-events in a 
threshold in order to unleash desire, to evoke experimentation” (p. 582). This 
work, therefore, maps my self becoming as an event to trouble the boundaries of 
binaries of discourses (Davies, 2000b), and to conceive of my self as the new kind 
of subject that Davies et al. (2006) hope for, one who is ethically forming self in a 
constant process of self-reflexivity. Ethics, for Foucault, are “the forms and 
modalities of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes and 
recognizes himself qua subject” (1985, p. 6). This means that the ethical 
formation of the self focuses on the necessary conditions for becoming ethical, 
and the potential and process of this becoming ethical. Foucault (1994d) argues 
that “freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the considered 
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form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection” (p. 284). This means 
that the preconditions for the formation of an ethical self are freedom and 
reflexivity. This reflexivity is important as it means that the subject can 
consciously consider the positions on offer by power/knowledge, and make 
considered decisions or choices from this critical position.  
 
The reflexive practice of an ethical self: Practices of freedom 
Foucault (1994b) outlines how the Stoics practiced an on-going care of the self as 
a way of continuously constructing an ethical self, or what he describes as the 
mode of subjectivation. Foucault (1994b) argues that subjectivation is predicated 
on the individual becoming conscious of the mechanism by which discourses 
become sutured or enfolded into the body of the individual. Once this occurs, the 
individual is able to proactively position him- or herself in the process, and this 
results in a transformation of the self through conscious monitoring and 
improving of him- or herself. In other words, the individual becomes ethical 
through conscious self-reflexivity.  
 
There are four aspects of subjectivation: ethical substance; mode of subjection; 
ethical work; and telos. Ethical substance concerns the position the subject takes 
up to practice the freedom available to them whilst also considering how this 
decision will impact on well-being of others (Markula & Pringle, 2006, p. 147). 
The mode of subjection concerns the decision-making process the subject 
undertakes concerning the question posed in the first aspect, namely, why it is 
important to be considerate of the well-being of others. The third aspect concerns 
the subject’s practical steps towards transformation, namely putting the ethical 
decision into practice. The fourth mode, telos, concerns the effect of the decision 
to act with the impact of others’ well-being in mind on the formation of the 
person’s identity as someone who acts ethically. Deleuze (1988) describes the 
telos as, “the fold of the outside itself, the ultimate fold: it is this that constitutes 
what Blanchot called an, ‘interiority of expectation’ from which the subject, in 
different ways, hopes for immortality, eternity, salvation, freedom or death or 
detachment” (p. 104). However, it is important to stress that the creation of an 
ethical self requires this critical process of reflection to be repeated time and time 
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again. This means that the goal of the four modes of subjectivation is never to 
discover or attain the true, or essential self. Rather, the point of this exercise, for 
Foucault (1994c), of conceiving of subjectivation as a continual process, is to 
emphasise the critical thinking and decision-making that goes into the forming of 
an ethical self-in-process. Attaining subjectivation is, therefore, accomplished 
through a life-long and on-going conscious process of self-care through self-
reflexivity in relationship with others. 
 
For Foucault (1994b), technologies of the self can be used to increase a person’s 
self-awareness and conscious decision-making to create themselves as a work of 
art that is created over the entire course of the person’s life. Foucault’s (1994b) 
thinking about the self is predicated on the idea that the individual can proactively 
create his or her life as if it were a work of art, as the sole purpose of one’s life is 
to transform it “into an object for a sort of knowledge, for a tekhne – for an art” 
(Foucault, 1994b, p. 271). Drawing from Foucault, McLaren (2002) argues that 
creating oneself as a work of art is “an ongoing project that involves constant 
work. This project is not complete until the end of one’s life” (p. 70). This idea of 
a conscious self-transformation, or what Foucault (1994b) calls a technology of 
the self, invites me to work on my self to create it as a work of art. However, this 
process requires knowledge, freedom of choice, and self-reflexivity in order to 
make ethical choices, as it is the choices that one makes that determines the 
makeup or formation of the self.  
 
Hypnomnemata 
Of importance for this study, is Foucault’s emphasis on how the Stoics’ self 
reflection took the form of writing detailed “letters to friends and disclosure of 
self; examination of self and conscience, including a review of what was done, of 
what should have been done, and comparison of the two” (Foucault, 1994b, p. 
258). Stoic students also engaged in writing hypnomnemata  (Foucault, 1994c), or 
notes the student took when he came to writing treatises. Markula and Pringle 
(2006) explain that the “hypnomnemata did not aim to reveal the hidden true self 
as in confessionals for the church or to ‘say the non-said’ to one’s psychoanalyst, 
but, on the contrary, to collect the already said, to reassemble that which one 
could hear or read, and to this an end which is nothing less than the constitution of 
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oneself” (p. 182). This introspective, detailed and reflective writing about the self 
was undertaken to bring about a greater understanding of, and care for, the self 
(Foucault, 1994b, p. 252).  
 
In light of this, I conceive of the writing, and analysis that I present in chapters 
five and six as a practice of ethical care of the self, and freedom. To this end, I 
include as much detail as possible in the stories and in the analysis presented in 
chapters five and six. I do this to reflect on my self becoming ethically, as an 
event, in relation with other/s (Jackson, 2010, p. 583). Foucault’s (1982, 1994b) 
thoughts on the care of the self and the writing of the self as a way of constructing 
the self, inform aspects of my autoethnographic writing practice. For me, 
autobiographical writing can be used to promote an ethics of care by making 
visible how the self is constituted within discourses. For Foucault, the aim of 
writing the self is, therefore, to create change for the self in the hope that this 
change will affect discursive structures.  
 
Self as political 
Practices of care for the self are a means to producing an ethical self-practice as 
they open the space for that self to be available to hear another person’s story. The 
Stoics’ practice of the care of the self was predicated on maintaining the good of 
all and the fostering of positive relationships with others. This is an ethical 
practice as it was “designed for administering one’s power in a non-dominant 
manner” (Markula & Pringle, 2006, p. 147).  Furthermore,  Probyn (1993), states 
that: 
The care of the self thus can only be conceived of and performed within 
the exigency of caring for others and for and within our distinct 
communities. The self is not an end in itself, it is the opening of a 
perspective, one which allows us to conceive of transforming our selves 
with the aid of others. Far from being a self-centred or self-centring action, 
this is to radically de-centre our selves, to work at the extremity where my 
self can be made to touch hers. (p. 169) 
Caring for the self provides a way to become concerned for, and to take a political 
stand to act for, and with, others. Foucault, (1994b) argues that by taking care of 
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the self “the soul will be able to discover rules to serve as a basis for just 
behaviour and political action. The effect of the soul to know itself is the principle 
on which just political action can be founded” (p. 231). Transformation of self 
through care of the self is the foundation for an ethical practice and political 
action. Markula and Pringle (2006) state that “forming a different ‘modern self’ 
does not mean an outright rupture of the power relations, but rather involves 
harnessing the existing power relations and knowledge to disrupt the current 
process of subjectivation” (p. 180). Deliberate re-positioning self and/or others 
within discourses amounts to a political move. However, any unpacking of 
operations of power/knowledge is predicated on a pre-existing awareness of 
power/knowledge and accountability towards others.  
 
In an interview with Olson and Worsham, Butler (2000) speaks of a theory of 
awareness or conscience, and explains how the subject comes to be formed in 
relationship. She states: “I become an object to myself at the moment in which I 
am accountable to an Other” (p. 749). Developing this awareness contributes to 
ethical practice, and arises from a desire to not unwittingly replicate operations of 
power/knowledge. This positioning, therefore, acts as a step towards social 
justice. Taking small and ordinary steps is an embodiment of Weingarten’s (2000) 
reasonable hope as they reduce the task of addressing positioning by discourses 
and injustices. These small steps are, therefore, an antidote to compassion fatigue, 
as they can act as an antidote to the sense of overwhelm that comes when one is 
faced with it.  
 
Coda 
The autobiographical stories presented and analysed in this thesis contain 
discursively located knowledges that inform my identity. I trouble these 
discourses (Davies, 200b) through an unpacking of the power structures that 
support their covert operations of power/knowledge. In the following chapter I 
discuss the poststructural methods that were used to create the autobiographical 
stories 
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Chapter Four: Methods of self data generation 
 
The Method: How I wrote the stories for chapter five 
Chapter five examines a re-storying of identity through a process of unpacking 
movement in re-visiting a personal story of failure as a learner on my first day of 
primary school in Rarotonga. I analyse the story that features in chapter five 
through the lens of White’s (2002) failure conversation map. This map builds on 
Foucault’s (1977, 1980, 1985, 1994c) ideas around exploring how our lives are 
formed through an internalising of modern power’s social control of normalising 
judgment, or practices. This work also speaks of Foucault’s (1994b) ideas of the 
care of the self. The consequence of failing to measure up to these practices is an 
invitation to take up a position in relation to failure. It is my desire for this work 
to restore, reclaim, and rebuild my identity as a learner: away from a deficit story 
saturated with lack, followed by overcompensation – pushing too hard on my self 
with regard to work – and resulting in compassion fatigue. 
 
In using White’s (2002) failure conversation map as a tool, I move towards 
agency in the journey of unpacking the failure story of my identity as a learner. I 
also expose the taken-for-granted rules of the educational discourse and 
demonstrate the positions that were made available to me by the discourses that I 
took up and resisted. I do this analysis to shift the burden of responsibility for 
failure, in this setting, back onto the educational discourse and make possible a 
“migration of identity” (White, 1995, p.99). For White (2002) such an inquiry 
opens the possibility to pursue an identity project that does not reproduce the 
favoured individualities of contemporary Western culture. In the act of refusing 
invitations to personal failure, White’s (2002) map helps to navigate these routes 
of personal failure in order to take a journey into a new territory of identity in 
which these acts of refusal of “modern power might be identified and become 
richly known” (White, 2002, p. 46). In his failure conversations map White 
(2002) identifies three practices of personal failure: lapses, omissions, and 
resistances. Lapses are everyday mistakes made by a person in the context of 
social relations. These lapses are invitations to be read as social incompetence, or 
a failure to perform in a socially appropriate way. Omissions are instances where 
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opportunities for self-improvement are lost, and resistances are actions taken to 
challenge or reject culturally respected norms or ways of being. The questions 
White devises for each of his eight steps of enquiry can be used to examine such 
aspects as personal failure in relation to something, or someone else, and the 
response to failure. Particular unique outcomes can be examined through the use 
of the map and these aspects can be interrogated for the beginnings of resistance 
and alternative identity. Other aspects of resistance that can be unpacked by 
White’s failure conversation map can also include examining the particular 
actions taken, as well as the person’s ethics, values and beliefs underpinning 
decisions that were made. Self-, and relationship-, forming activities as well as 
telos, or the person’s aim or purpose for their life, can be recognised through the 
use of White’s (2002) model.  
 
Techniques of poststructural autoethnography: Chapter five 
 
 Outsider witness ceremony 
In the research, I engage in a process of investigating my own identity movement 
through re-visiting a personal story of failure as a six-year-old. This story 
emerged in the process of performing my identity in an outsider witness ceremony 
in front of a Master of Counselling class. In an outsider witness interview, the 
person performs a story from their life in front of an audience of witnesses, who 
then reflect and relate how the story resonates with, and transports them. The 
person listens and does not speak. In the final phase, the person takes back the 
tellings and “retells the meanings she or he made of the telling” (Crocket & 
Kotzé, 2011, p. 398). In this context, the purpose of outsider witnessing is 
threefold: Firstly, it creates an audience to witness this experience of failure, such 
witnessing helps to counteracts the way isolation supports problems. Secondly, 
this form of ritual makes possible a storying of a reflexive and responsive 
practitioner. Thirdly, being witnessed helps to thicken the subordinate story 
(White, 2005), so helps to produce preferred identities for the people we work 
with. This means that in participating in these ceremonies, the therapist gains 
valuable experience how to facilitate these rituals. 
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The story of the six-year-old emerged when the interviewer enquired about my 
first experience of failure as a learner. This question helped to bring the 
experience forward for me and, during the reflecting part of the ceremony, the 
students reflected on what I had said, which resonated with their experience of 
being called into failure positions when they were children and/or adults. As I 
listened to the team’s resonances, I discovered that they too, had experienced 
failure in educational contexts. I found this experience to be reassuring and 
comforting, as their experiences resonated with mine, and confirmed that I was 
not alone in experiencing difficulty in an educational setting.  
 
Listening to self 
Later, when I listened to the tape of this outsider witness ritual, I engaged in a 
mode of listening informed by Andersen’s (1997) “four ways of knowing” (p. 
171) approach. These are the rational, the practical, the relational, and the bodily 
ways of knowing. Andersen’s (1997) stance is that, historically, the first two ways 
(the rational and practical) of knowing have been privileged by the psychotherapy 
profession. For him, the last two forms of knowing are underutilised and he 
argues convincingly that these be utilised by therapists.  Relational knowing is “to 
find a position in relation to one or more others so that these relationships are 
tolerable” (Andersen, 1997, p. 171), whereas, bodily knowing is being able to 
recognise affect, or visceral bodily reactions when “something significant is being 
expressed, without necessarily knowing what the significance entails” (Andersen, 
1997, p. 171). By engaging in these two forms of listening, the listener enhances 
their ability to listen to the inner conversation that they have with themselves, 
namely the two parts of the person, the ‘I’ and the virtual other. This listening 
practice develops self-reflexivity. 
 
Compassionate witnessing 
As I listened and re-listened to the tape, I noted the inner conversation and bodily 
reactions I was having. I took up a “compassionate witnessing” position 
(Weingarten, 2003, p.192) of the self that was telling, and had lived through the 
events of the story, of my self as a six-year-old on my first day at school in 
Rarotonga. As I listened, I focussed on language that I had used to tell the story 
that I felt to be particularly striking. When I identified an utterance that seemed 
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significant, I paused the tape. I then consciously slowed down my inner dialogue 
in order to dwell on the utterance and bodily re-experience, reconnect and re-
member the experience I had had. Speedy (2005) suggests that the writer captures 
words and phrases that resonate and sit very closely to the near experience at the 
time as these captured moments lift the ordinary into the realm of the sacred. I 
experienced this as a deepening of the story as I thought about each striking 
moment. In this process of listening, I brought my focus to my ‘bodily’ felt sense 
of knowing and watched for any significant moments of tension, frustration, 
excitement, epiphany or sadness I felt towards the adult and child self, as well as 
the teacher, my family and the story events I was recounting. During the process 
of listening to the recording of my story, I remained alert for significant moments 
when I had positioned the teacher in my story as she, too, had been operating from 
multiple positions made available to her within the available discourses. Once the 
listening was done I wrote the story, which took the form of a rescued speech 
poem (Speedy, 2005).  
 
Rescued speech poems 
Speedy’s (2005) work is informed by key psychoanalytic feminists, Kristeva, 
Irigaray and who contend that poetic writing can be a way of resisting taken for 
granted discursive practices and constraints. Speedy (2005) argues that poetic 
writing can be seen as a political and ethical act, and states: “poetic language 
speaks to that which is not fixed or known and that which ‘moves or escapes’ and 
appears to defy the confines of conventional language” (p. 285). Writing in a 
poetic way illuminates that which has not been said Cixous (1991) and highlights 
the (im)possibility of writing the self and disturbs the humanist idea that the self is 
coherent and stable. Textual tricks of layout and format can be used to put ideas 
and concepts “under erasure” (Bennington & Derrida, 1993), which helps to 
undermine the authority of the self in the story. Gannon (2006) suggests that the 
writer does not attempt to write in a coherent or linear fashion, rather to make use 
of “discontinuous fragments informed by memory, body, photographs, other texts, 
other people” (p. 491). Barthes writes his autobiography (1977) in a fragmentary 
and imaginative way, which challenges the conventional ways of re-presenting 
oneself autobiographically and through this, destabilizes the idea of a coherent 
self.  
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Out of the process of synthesising and translating the notes I had made, while 
listening and re-listening, emerged a piece of free verse – a form of poetic writing 
with no structure. This form is designed to be read aloud, resplendent with pause 
for dramatic effect. I chose this form as I wished to transcend the everyday and 
exoticise the ordinary (taken-for-granted) situation I was writing about. 
Whitworth (2006) argues that writers of free verse “must raise language from the 
everyday – it really does have to be ‘the best words in the best order’” (p. 99). I 
shaped the writing through the use of poetic writing techniques such as variable 
line length, ellipsis and space around the writing, and I used repeated key phrases 
to add emphasis and drama for the reader/listener.  
 
Reasonable hope 
Undertaking this exercise in deconstructing my experience of personal failure as a 
six-year-old learner uncovers how I took up, resisted and refused positions made 
available to me by discourses in operation in this setting. The reasonable hope 
(Weingarten, 2010) I have for this work is to be able to take up a position that 
allows me to look for similar opportunities with clients in my counselling work. 
This way of working enables a discursive positioning to be the focus, offers me a 
preferred stance of compassionate witnessing of self, and other (Weingarten, 
2003).  
 
Plugging in the data 
In my desire to locate a voice that is transgressive, I draw upon Jackson and 
Mazzei’s (2012) practice of “plugging in” (p. 5) the theory into the data. This 
plugging in is a form of analysis that involves applying theoretical lenses to the 
stories in chapters five and six, to make visible movement of identity, and to 
trouble the borders of binaries of discourses (Davies, 2000b). The hope for this 
plugging in exercise is to create a “different relationship among texts: [to see 
how] they constitute one another and in doing so create something new” (Jackson 
& Mazzei, 2012, p. 4). This new thing that emerges from the plugging in of the 
theory into the data, is a self in the process of shifting position to create a more 
ethical practice of self that invites resistance of power.  
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The Method: How I wrote the stories for chapter six 
The process of writing the stories that feature in chapter six began through re-
visiting the car accident.  I decided to write about this experience of migration of 
identity as I wanted to deconstruct this traumatic experience. As I wrote and 
rewrote the stories about my experiences, the migration of identity stared me in 
‘the face’.  
 
Working my self as event 
I undertake this Deleuzo-Guattarian analysis through exploring concrete, 
molecular instances in the five stories featured in the chapter six. I explore this 
territory to illustrate the effects of the car accident, and demonstrate how identity 
is produced in relation with others, and what happens when two parties 
deterritorialize on a line of flight together. I do this analysis to work the metaphor 
of self as event (Jackson, 2010, p. 583), or becoming (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, 
p. 276) and analyse how the subject moves her/my body, and expresses her/my 
desires (see Jackson, 2010). These specificities comprise the activity of my self as 
event of coming into being, or becoming, through the connections she/I make/s 
with others.  
 
Techniques of poststructural autoethnography: Chapter six 
 
Listening to self 
I began the process of selecting key events from this time period by thinking 
about this time and recalling those moments that struck me as powerful or turning 
points. I began to write down fragments of the memories I could recall, and read 
those recollections and fragments of memories to people close to me. I also 
recorded myself telling the stories to others. When I listened to the tape, I again 
called upon Andersen’s (1997) bodily and relational ways of knowing to capture 
my physical reactions to, and inner conversations about, what was being 
expressed. As I listened, I made notes that formed the kernels for the stories. I 
noted these down and began to write the stories. During this time of drafting and 
developing the stories, I revisited my old diaries as well as the many letters to the 
surgeons and ACC that I had kept on file. In the process of re-reading the letters 
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and notes, I selected one letter I wrote to the surgeon who performed the last 
major surgery to my face, and it is presented verbatim in chapter six. 
 
Creating mo(ve)ment 
Initially, I wrote these stories in the first person and then read my stories aloud to 
my supervisor. Reading the stories aloud brought the images clearly to my mind’s 
eye, to hear and feel the tone, the pauses, the energy and vibrations of my voice in 
the telling and retelling process. The close attention I paid to, and detailed 
questions that my supervisor posed of, the texts helped to develop them in many 
ways. Davies (2009a) proposes that this careful listening and questioning by 
another to the teller’s stories leads to greater and greater “remembered, embodied, 
affective detail, [and] each story becomes imaginable with/in the minds/bodies of 
everyone” (p. 9). I recorded myself reading the stories aloud and then edited them, 
carefully checking that my writing did not contain clichés and explanations. I then 
shared the written versions of the stories with my parents for their memories. 
Over a number of weeks, we worked back and forth together, weaving and 
embroidering our ideas into the fabric of my stories.  
 
I experienced this process of writing, telling and rewriting the stories as a delving 
into smaller and smaller details. During this process I experienced a shift in my 
perspective, and the stories seemed to take on a life of their own and become more 
than just autobiographical memories. It was almost as if they became stories about 
someone else. Davies (2009b) describes this shift as mo(ve)ment or the double 
action of “dwelling in and on particular moments of being, and of movement 
toward, or openness to, new possibilities both in seeing and of being” (Davies, 
2009b, p. 9). I experienced this mo(ve)ment as greater sense of relationality and a 
resulting lessening of isolation. It was as if the stories that I had written were 
expanding and providing “new insights into the processes of being and becoming 
in the world – new ways of being subjects” (Davies, 2009b, p. 10). It was at this 
time that I read Davies and Gannon (2009) poststructural collective 
autoethnographic work and was introduced to the theory of Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987). Discovering the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) opened the 
door to conceive of a self who is always becoming different to self, in relationship 
with others.  
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Voice/s 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987), as well as Jackson (2010, p. 583), write of identity 
as multiple, open-ended, and interconnected with others, and the natural world. 
This perspective opens up the possibility of understanding self as the possibility 
of multiple becomings-in-relation. I use different voices in my stories to illustrate 
this multiplicity and fluidity of becoming. By shifting from the first, second and 
third person – I, she, you – I open up lines of flight and deterritorialisation. I do 
this to demonstrate how the individual is produced by relationship and the social, 
and to challenge the concept of the identity as an autonomous, fixed, individual, 
masterful and coherent self.  
 
I write the stories of the car accident in the second person as a way to position me 
with a greater degree of distance from the painful events related in the stories. 
Using the voice of the second person also opens up new ways of reading for the 
audience, as it allows the reader to draw on their imagination, rather than be 
positioned as solely dependent on the writer’s interpretation of events. The second 
person voice also positions the reader to experience a sense of becoming other, 
and invites them to take up the subject of the story’s position, and point of view – 
a becoming-I. Writing about self in the second person also opens up opportunity 
for me to take a step back from the experience, which invites reflexivity. 
Separating my self from this subjugated in-valid self acts to counteract the 
objectification of identity that locates these events as the truth of my identity (see 
White, 2007, p. 25). In the process of writing this thesis, I experience this as a 
loosening of the connection to the in-valid identity, as well as the face being 
reconstructed through surgery.  
 
Jackson (2010) refuses the narrative, or molar, ‘I’ in her Deleuzian-informed 
ethnographic exploration into cheerleading in a rural small-town high school in 
the rural, southern United States of America. She claims that a first person 
narrative contains a stronger essence of molarity, which shuts down the possibility 
of transformation for the reader as it fools the reader into thinking that the whole 
story is being told. However, I claim first person identity when I step into the 
researcher identity in the academic and theoretical analysis sections of the chapter 
six. I do this as it invites greater flexibility and creativity into my writing. Using 
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the first person ‘I’, also positions me to call upon the work of theorists, 
philosophers, medical specialists and practitioners to speak into my voice.  
 
In the analysis sections in the chapter six, I write in the third person and address 
my self as subject as ‘she’. I do this to signal the data/content, or subject/object, of 
the research. The hope for the writing is to open up the possibility for the different 
voices to assist in deconstructing – the subject’s (my) becoming as a process in 
action, a multiplicity of possible beings, the I (academic researcher), the you (the 
line of flight/becoming/affected subject), and the she (the molarised subject). 
 
Affect 
In chapter six I endeavor to trace the movements of my identity generated by 
affective moments in the five stories. I hunt for moments of affect as they signal 
the possibility for a line of flight. Hickey-Moody and Malin (2007) describe the 
immediacy of affect and its effects as “that which is felt before it is thought; it has 
a visceral impact on the body before it is given subjective or emotive meaning. 
Thinking through affect brings the sensory capacity of the body to the fore” (p. 8). 
Affect arises through the “intermingling of bodies in a society including all the 
attractions and repulsions, sympathies and antipathies, alterations, amalgamations, 
penetrations, and expansions that affect bodies of all kinds in their relations to one 
another” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 90). I undertake this micro, or molecular 
analysis to draw attention to the ways affective connections with others created, or 
stymied movement, or change for me/the subject. 
 
Migration of identity 
The analysis I undertake in chapter six traces the journey of my/the subject’s 
migration of identity (White, 1995) that is generated by the car accident. White 
(1995) explains how migration of identity can emerge out of a traumatic 
experience, such as domestic violence or, as was the situation for me, a car 
accident, and how in the process of migration for the traumatized individual:  
there is always some distance between the point of separation from the 
abusive context and the point of arrival at some preferred location in life, 
and at some alternative and preferred account of one’s identity. There is 
always some distance between these two points in terms of time. And in this 
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space, as in any migratory process [people]… characteristically go through a 
range of experiences, many of them difficult. In this ‘liminal’ or ‘betwixt 
and between’ space, confusion and disorientation reigns, and often nothing 
seems manageable any more … It is in this space that …[people] are 
vulnerable to a sense of total incompetence and personal failure, to feelings 
of desperation and acute despair. (pp. 99-100) 
The stories in chapter six portray the sense of liminality and despair that the 
subject experiences. They also trace the process of subjectivation that the subject 
experiences on her journey through this migration of identity, of self as event, of 
becoming. Conceiving of self and other as evolving and continuously changing, 
offers reasonable hope (Weingarten, 2010) that movement towards preferred 
identity and away from the territory of the problem is possible.  
 
Protecting the privacy of others 
In her autoethnographic study about becoming a counselling trainer, Meekums 
(2008) describes how she edited out material to maintain privacy for people she 
had written about. While I write about my self in relationship with others, I take 
my cue from Meekums and have been very careful to ensure that the others I write 
about are not named and cannot be identified in any way. To protect the privacy 
of others featured in this study I also take pains to never mention the time, 
location, and setting of the stories. 
 
Coda  
The study calls upon White’s (2002) failure conversation map to analyse a 
personal experience of failure in an educational when I was six-years-old. The 
research also draws upon Deleuzo-Guattarian theory to analyse lines of flight and 
migration of identity that make self as event possible through the writing of the 
self.  The techniques outlined in this chapter are valuable tools to trouble the 
borders of the binaries of discourses and can be used to facilitate critical 
reflexivity and movement towards subjectivation. The next chapter calls upon 
White’s (2002) failure conversation map to analyse an early story of failure in an 
educational setting. 
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Chapter Five: The story of the six-year-old 
 
The story of the six-year-old 
 
I am six. 
I am at school in Rarotonga.  
I’m new here. I don’t know anybody. 
 
I do not like my teacher. She is mean. 
 
I do not understand what she says. 
 
She writes mysterious squiggles on the blackboard with chalk. Up and 
down and around.  
 
For the life of me I cannot make out what they are. Perhaps they are 
numbers? Bored, I gaze out the window, willing myself out of the 
classroom I see the outline of large flamboyant trees against the brown 
grass of the field. Are those red splotches I can only just make out in the 
trees, flowers? I hear a buzzing sound of a motorised bike zipping along 
the straight one-lane road that lies just past the field. I’d like a bike like 
that. I could ride it across that road, down the lane, past the fluffy kapok 
plants, to home. Would they notice if I just went home? Could I just jump 
out the window? 
 
I realise that the others are writing in their books with the pale blue and 
little faint squares on the pages. I don’t want to be left out, left behind.  
I am dumb. Really stupid. 
 
I don’t want to be dumb. I don’t think I’m stupid. I have to do something. I 
glance surreptitiously out of the corners of my eyes at their work. Slowly 
my eyes shift left, then right. I look up, as if I am thinking, but I am 
checking that the teacher is not looking at me. She isn’t.  
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Without moving my head I again swivel my eyes to the right as far as I 
can. I can feel the muscles of my eyes straining.  Slowly I shift my gaze 
left. With confidence I copy what I can see they are doing and write 
random, indecipherable ‘numbers’ and squiggles on my page too. I try to 
be as neat on the page as possible. The effort it takes to painstakingly try 
to fit the squiggles neatly inside the little faint pale blue squares forces the 
tip of my tongue to follow the movement of my hand. Up…and…down 
and…around. Up…and…down…and…around….I clutch the new red 
pencil tightly. The shape of the pencil presses almost painfully into the 
fingers of my right hand. Later, I would see the marks of the squiggles I 
carefully inscribe have indented deeply into the next few pages of my book.  
There. I stare at my handiwork and nod. That should do it. 
 
Satisfied, I close my book. 
 
The teacher collects our books. 
 
After break, the class lines up to go into the classroom. I walk past my 
teacher as she talks to another teacher. I line up. In spite of the jostling, I 
manage to get myself into fourth place in the line. We all wait. I smile at 
the other children. I am trying to be friendly. I don’t know anybody here 
and I’d like to have at least one friend to play with during the breaks. We 
all begin to play a game that involves singing a little song about the order 
in the line; ‘first the worst, second the best, third the golden 
princess…fourth the dwarf….’. Dwarf? The children all laugh at me 
because fourth place is where I’m standing. ‘Fourth the dwarf! Fourth the 
DWARF! Oooh yuck, you’re a daawarrrf!’. My toes curl in dismay…I’d 
rather be a princess…but there’s a girl in that place looking very pleased 
with herself. I really don’t think she’ll swap with me. I look around at the 
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jeering faces. Looks like no one will change places with me. I consider 
moving to the back of the line as the laughing gets louder and louder. I 
decide against moving when they start to hassle the boy in first place. 
Gratefully, I join in and we all chant at him, ‘first the worst, first the 
WORST!’. He manages to grimace and look defiant at the same time. I 
wonder if he’ll cave under the pressure give up his position. The class 
becomes more and more boisterous as they jostle each other for position. 
What’s taking the teacher so long? I glance over towards the staffroom. I 
can just make out the shape of two women standing talking to each other. I 
recognise the colours of the dress my teacher is wearing. The shape walks 
towards us. It’s my teacher all right. She passes right by me, and looks 
directly down at me. I see that she has a funny look on her face. Why? Is 
something wrong? Suddenly, right in front of my nose, tucked under her 
arm I see a book. Is that mine? A shock of recognition zaps through my 
body. My teacher has my book with the little faint pale blue squares with 




Run! Can’t! Why are my feet glued to the ground? My toes grip inside my 
sandals. As I try to grip onto the ground, I feel the earth tip sideways.  
Time slows down. The trees overhanging the veranda loom threateningly 




I feel sick to my stomach.  
 
My heart pounds loudly.  
 
I hold my breath. I have been caught out. I want to ask her for my book 
back, but my mouth is dry and my tongue is stuck to the roof of my mouth. 
I am struck dumb.  
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What will she do with my book? Am I in trouble? Are they going to throw 
me out? Am I not good enough for this place? Will I be punished? Will 
they hit me? Will they shout at me for not doing it properly? Will they tell 




 I am dumb. Really stupid.  
 
I cannot see. 
 
I cannot see my way clear. I cannot see the blackboard.  
 
I cannot see the (cup) board.  
 
The cupboard is bare. 
 
Using bodily knowing to identify significant moments in the six-year-old 
story: 
 
As described in the method section for this chapter in chapter three, I call on 
Andersen’s (1997) relational and bodily ways of knowing to identity significant 
moments in the constructing of the story. The first moment of significance that I 
know bodily, is the sense of newness that comes from being in a new school in a 
foreign country.  
I’m new here. I don’t know anybody. 
The sense of lack of support or alienation that arises from the new teacher not 
conforming to what I have witnessed my new entrant teacher doing when new 
students started school in New Zealand, is the second bodily felt moment of 
significance.  
I do not like my teacher. She is mean. 
I do not understand what she says. 
The third moment of significance that strikes me in the listening and re-listening 
process is the horrifying bodily sense of deepening isolation and sense of being 
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different as I realise the other students have understood the teacher’s instructions 
and are doing something that I cannot. 
I realise that the others are writing in their books with the little faint pale 
blue squares on the pages. I don’t want to be left out, left behind.  
The fourth moment of significance is the shocking conclusion that I draw from 
comparing myself unfavourably with the other students who can perform the set 
task. This means that there is something seriously wrong with my intelligence. It 
also means that I do not belong in the new school and that I do not know how to 
start the work. 
I am dumb. Really stupid. 
The significant fifth moment is the realisation that I want to resist this positioning 
as dumb, and I experience a desire to conform with the rest of the class.  
I don’t want to be dumb. I don’t think I’m stupid. I have to do something. I 
glance surreptitiously out of the corners of my eyes at their work. Slowly 
my eyes shift left, then right. I look up, as if I am thinking, but I am 
checking that the teacher is not looking at me. She isn’t.  
The sixth striking moment I experience bodily is a sense of relief and satisfaction. 
This arises from successfully outwitting my fellow students as well as the teacher 
through devising a strategy that technically complies with the teacher’s 
instructions, and covers up this inability to conform. It is also a moment of 
recognising that I have managed to save myself from being labelled ‘dumb’ and 
‘really stupid’.  
There. I stare at my handiwork and nod. That should do it. 
Satisfied, I close my book. 
The seventh moment of significance I experience in my body is the shock of 
recognition, embarrassment, and terror of being discovered by the teacher as 
dumb and that I am at the bottom of the class. This means that I do not belong in 
this class with my peers: 
What’s taking the teacher so long? I glance over towards the staffroom. I 
can just make out the shape of two women standing talking to each other. I 
recognise the colours of the dress my teacher is wearing. The shape walks 
towards us. It’s my teacher all right. She passes right by me, and looks 
directly down at me. I see that she has a funny look on her face. Why? Is 
something wrong? Suddenly, right in front of my nose, tucked under her 
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arm I see a book. Is that mine? A shock of recognition zaps through my 
body. My teacher has my book with the little faint pale blue squares with 




Run! Can’t! Why are my feet glued to the ground? My toes grip inside my 
sandals. As I try to grip onto the ground, I feel the earth tip sideways.  
Time slows down. The trees overhanging the veranda loom threateningly 




I feel sick to my stomach.  
 
My heart pounds loudly.  
The eighth moment that registers bodily for me during the listening and re-
listening process is the sense of panic as I realise that there will be dire 
consequences at school and at home for the dumbness. The reality of the futility at 
trying to outwit the system also sinks in:  
What will she do with my book? Am I in trouble? Are they going to throw 
me out? Am I not good enough for this place? Will I be punished? Will 
they hit me? Will they shout at me for not doing it properly? Will they tell 




 I am dumb. Really stupid.  
Performing this exercise of tapping into my bodily and relational knowing brings 
forward a re-membering of the effects of the position calls of failure, and the 
resistant positions I take up. I now call on White’s (2002) personal failure 
conversation map to further deconstruct this early experience of personal failure. I 
perform this exercise to analyse and unpack the multiple positions available to me 
within discourses that I took up, and refused. I engage in this to bring about a 
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better understanding of how the modern system operates, and to discern how it 
deflects failure back onto the subject/my self. 
 
Deconstructing the story using Michael White’s (2002) failure 
conversations map 
 
I now use White’s (2002) categories from his “failure conversations map” (p. 58), 
to refuse invitations to personal failure. I use White’s (2002) map as it provides a 
way of unpacking the way modern power operates in my life, and makes visible 
its invitation for personal blame for failure in educational contexts. In this section, 
I examine the positionings available to me through unpacking the story of the six-
year-old. I undertake this application of White’s map in order to unpack my early 
identity claim conclusions. I perform this exploration to re-visit and re-perform 
my identity as a learner in a preferred way. I wish to make visible moments of 
subjugation, or the formation of my self as object/subject, to re-constitute my self 
as subjectivated. Andersen (1993), explains that this act of expressing a self 
is simultaneously forming One’s Self. The act of expressing oneself is the 
act of constituting One’s Self. Maybe performing is a better word than 
expressing. That is, when a person is performing, this performing is 
informing oneself and others and simultaneously forming One’s Self. (p. 
309) 
I perform this analysis as I hope to increase my understanding of how I took up, 
and resisted, the various positions available to me within the discourses operating 
in the classroom, in particular, the educational discourse. This exercise is, 
therefore, an exploration of the reconstituting of myself through creating the space 
for me to listen to my inner dialogue. Foucault’s (1994b) ideas about the Stoics’ 
practice of silent listening to the teacher, and also to their own logos or reason, 
inform this practice of self listening to self-as-teacher. Andersen (1993) contends 
that “[b]eing in conversation with oneself and/or others can be seen as a constant 
movement toward an understanding of oneself, one’s surroundings, and one’s 
relationships. A self is a moving and changing being (p. 310)”. I shape White’s 
eight steps to create a lens to understand this experience of failure, as I am curious 
as to why this old story of failure keeps returning for me. The genre of this 
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particular failure story comes under the heading of lapse, or  “unsatisfactory 
performance of [my] assigned social role” (White, 2002, p. 45). I call on White’s 
(2002) map to try and unpack, listen to, and re-position self in relation to, the 
multiple discourses operating at the time.  
 
Application of White’s (2002) failure conversation map to the 
story of the six-year-old  
 
Step 1. Failure in relation to… 
This category is concerned with unpacking the expectations, norms and standards 
that I fail to reproduce in my acts of learning at the time of the story. Educational 
discursive practices, such as expectations of obedience and compliance, norms of 
being able to work on set tasks in a timely manner, and working at standards set, 
position me to conclude that I am stupid, inadequate, incompetent, and useless. 
Drawing on White (2002), I pose the following question of my story: What were 
the expectations, norms and standards that you feel you failed to meet in the 
classroom environment? 
 
I had attended school for a year in New Zealand before my family and I moved to 
Rarotonga. During that initial year, I had come to learn the expectations of my 
teacher and the school environment, namely, to comply with the teacher’s wishes 
and to follow the rules of the classroom. In the New Zealand setting, at the time, 
the educational discourse offered me a narrow range of positions, namely, that of 
an obedient, compliant student who would follow instructions, not talk out of turn, 
and who would line up patiently with her picture in her hand waiting for the 
teacher to write on it.  
 
On my first day of school in Rarotonga, I wish to step into compliance and 
obedience. This is evidenced by my obediently waiting in line at the end of the 
break for the teacher to let us into the classroom. However, I am not able to take 
up this preferred position of obedience, as I cannot understand the teacher’s 
accent, nor interpret what she is instructing the class to do. My thoughts are: 
I do not like my teacher. She is mean. 
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I do not understand what she says. 
I do not know that I am shortsighted, and that I cannot see what the others see. 
Because I am seated towards the rear of the classroom, I cannot make out what the 
teacher is writing on the board. The physical seating arrangements contribute to a 
position of failure. My earlier New Zealand experience of a classroom setting was 
of someone who can raise her hand in order to ask the teacher a question. 
However, in the new school, the only option is one of quiet obedience and silence. 
This means that rather than raise my hand, I submit in order to not draw attention 
to myself, and my inability to understand the task at hand. I also hold enough 
knowledge to know that I do not want anybody else to suspect that I do not know 
how to continue. I think that it is my responsibility to understand the teacher and 
follow her instructions. Faced with the inherent injustice of this position, I shift 
the blame from myself to the teacher, and position her as “mean”. 
 
Step 2. Response to failure 
White (2002) invites reflection on the actions that a person initiates in their efforts 
to address these failures and inadequacies. I discipline myself in order to measure 
up and meet expectations, norms and standards. Drawing on White (2002), I pose 
the following question of my text: How did not measuring up feel? What did you 
do in response to being positioned as a failure in this context? 
 
Because I can neither understand the teacher’s instructions, nor see the 
blackboard, I am unable to comply with the instructions. The moment I realise 
this, I step into an identity that calls on incompetence and disobedience. I wish to 
be obedient with every fibre of my being, yet cannot comply. I feel embarrassed, 
frustrated, uncomfortable, and isolated. The educational discourse is so strong, 
and I have so completely enfolded it into my identity (see Probyn, 1993) that I 
endeavour to comply with the teacher’s expectations. I am motivated to devise a 
strategy to perform a direct, and therefore risky ‘cheating’ look, and cast a covert 
sidelong glance at the other student’s books, even though I know that this is an 
unacceptable move: 
Without moving my head I again swivel my eyes to the right as far as I 
can. I can feel the muscles of my eyes straining.  Slowly I shift my gaze 
left. 
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The fear is that if I perform a direct look, the students on either side of me will tell 
me not to look at their work, and the teacher will know of my incompetence. 
According to the normalising practices (Foucault, 1977, 1980, 1985, 1994c) of the 
educational discourse, every student in the class must be engaged in the same task 
at the same time, reach their developmental educational milestones at the same 
time as their peers. This positions each student as responsible for his or her own 
learning outcomes. Failing to measure up to the expectation, means to take up a 
position of self-blame. This position is reflected in the words I use that locates the 
blame for this failure with my self:  
I am dumb. Really stupid.  
I hear the words ‘dumb, and ‘stupid’ in my inner dialogue and know that this 
means failure within this context educational and familial expectation. Being 
positioned as a failure is simply untenable. In desperation, I seek to counter it in 
an act of resistance towards the position call of failure: 
I don’t want to be dumb. I don’t think I’m stupid. I have to do something… 
As I resist the position call of dumbness, I shift to a new position – one where I 
have a strategy and look surreptitiously out of the corner of my eyes at my fellow 
students’ work. I see and copy what they I think they are doing: 
With confidence I copy what I can see they are doing. 
I have mastered the educational discourse sufficiently to realise that certain 
subjects are to be done in particular exercise books, and that exercise books with 
the little squares in a faint blue colour signify that the class is engaged in 
‘mathematics’. Even though I do not follow the teacher’s instructions, nor see the 
exercise written in chalk on the board, I respect the lines being drawn by the 
educational discourse to take up the invitation to be a compliant student and ‘good 
daughter’. I observe the other students beginning work… I copy their behaviour 
and begin to: 
…write random, indecipherable ‘numbers’ and squiggles on my page too. 
I try to be as neat on the page as possible.  
While I can neither follow the teacher’s instructions properly, nor see what is 
being written on the board, I pretend that I can. I draw on the specific knowledges 
I hold, and implement a strategy of checking out what the others are doing, and 
mimic what I think I can see them doing. I try to be as neat on the page as 
possible as I want to comply with the expectations of the teacher, and maintain a 
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position of obedience and conformity. This strategy seems to work at first and I 
feel relief in my body, and take pride in creating the numbers and squiggles: 
This is working. 
Relief… I try to be as neat on the page as possible….There. I stare at my 
handiwork and nod. That should do it. 
Satisfied, I close my book.  
However, this pretence of bravado and confidence backfires rather dramatically 
when the teacher takes my book to show another teacher, and the squiggles revert 
to nonsense. I experience the fear of punitive ramifications of both the school, and 
my family:  
What will she do with my book? Am I in trouble? Are they going to throw 
me out? Am I not good enough for this place? Will I be punished? Will 
they hit me? Will they shout at me for not doing it properly? Will they tell 
my father? Please no.  
As a student coming from New Zealand, my Rarotongan teacher may have 
positioned me as some one who had to be ‘observed’, a newcomer to their country 
and school. She may also have assumed that I did not require any assistance, 
coming, as I did, from the ‘Big Island’ - New Zealand. My family transferred to 
Rarotonga as the New Zealand government had seconded my father to work for 
the Cook Island government for three years. At that time New Zealand had an 
arrangement to provide support to the Cook Islands by sending New Zealand 
public servants to take up posts in Cook Island government departments. When 
we arrived in Rarotonga, there were two primary schools, one secondary school, 
one teachers’ training school, and one Catholic kindergarten. I was enrolled at the 
only English speaking primary school that was located next door to the much 
larger Rarotongan Maori speaking school. Even though both schools shared a 
large field, the students from both the schools were segregated. We were able to 
tell each other apart because the students from my school wore blue uniforms, 
while the students at the neighbouring school wore green ones. I do not recall the 
segregation policy being enforced or policed by the staff of either school, so I 
wonder now if perhaps the lack of interaction may have resulted from us not 
sharing a common language. This seems odd, however, as the majority of the 
students attending my school were Rarotongan, and would have spoken 
Rarotongan Maori at home. However, they always spoke English while at school. 
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The majority of the children’s parents worked for the Cook Island government, 
and I can only assume that they would have wanted their children to become 
fluent in English so they could have access to better employment opportunities.  
Given the evident segregation, and the fact that I was a Pakeha New Zealander, it 
is possible that the teacher may have viewed me as someone from outside; a 
descendent of the colonisers. There has been a long history of colonisation of the 
Cook Islands, beginning in 1888, when the Cook Islands became a British 
protectorate in order to avoid French expansionism. In 1901, governance of the 
Cook Islands was transferred by Britain to New Zealand. In 1965, the Cook 
Islands became a self-governing State in free association with New Zealand 
(Cook Island History, 2011). Along with the positioning of me as a descendent of 
the colonisers by the teacher, I, in turn, may have also taken up a position of 
relative privilege associated within historical and political developments. 
 
Notably absent from the story of the six-year-old was the story of colonization 
and prejudice that I uncover. As I look into the gaps, to examine where I am 
positioned in the racial discourse, I wonder why I do not address prejudice in my 
identity, namely the need I felt as a Pakeha person to be treated as special by the 
teacher, and that she should have taken time for me, as I was from big island. 
Now that I stand in a different place I wonder how I positioned the teacher – was 
there any prejudice in my little body, with my little white face? The fact that the 
school was attended by Pakeha students, and the English-speaking children of 
Rarotongan government employees, and was situated next door to a Rarotongan 
Maori-speaking school, I wonder now, in hindsight, how the children from the 
neighbouring school were positioned in relation to the English-speaking school 




The re-membering and re-visiting of the playful song we sing about the four 
positions at the front of the line can be interpreted to reflect both the acceptance 
and the troubling of the power play of competitiveness, individualism, and 
success. All of which are hallmarks of the discourse of late capitalism, as well as 
the values and beliefs that underpin the metadiscourse of neoliberalism: 
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First the worst, second the best, third the golden princess…fourth the 
dwarf. 
The song we sing while waiting in line undermines the taken-for-granted idea of 
hierarchy and power/knowledge - namely that first is always best, and second 
always plays second fiddle to the first placeholder. The song represents an ironic 
interpretation of competition and operates as a deception, or ironic questioning, of 
the four different ‘positions’ at the front of the line. Rather than feeling oppressed 
by the fact that only one ‘lucky’ person was able to hold the ‘first’ place, the 
children waiting in the line invite playfulness to support them to not take up the 
position that takes this competition or hierarchy seriously.  
 
The rhyme we sing challenges the taken-for-granted privilege/s of the categories 
of the first four placeholders. By singing it we question certain fixed societal rules 
about this order of positioning. Through questioning the privilege of the first 
position, the song questions power/knowledge. This illustrates how 
power/knowledge is not structural, but relational (Foucault, 1980). By playing 
with, and questioning the power of, the first position, the children are in the 
process of becoming subjects. Through singing the song, which supports power 
ideas, but undermines them at the same time, we are coming to an understanding 
of how power/knowledge operates. By both accepting and undermining 
power/knowledge we are actively in the process of mastering the discourse of 
competition, and the inherent status of holding the first-place, whilst 
simultaneously submitting to it. This is double-edged action, however, as while I 
experience the belittling of the others I simultaneously exercise power over, the 
others children in the first three places, especially the boy in the first place. 
 
The first line ‘first the worst’ of the rhyme we sing while waiting in line reflects 
the ambivalence of taking up the position call of ‘first’; superiority, or seniority. 
To be positioned as first invites a combination of envy and resentment from the 
other students in the line, as only one person could be first. By singing the ditty 
the other students in the line hope to bring enough pressure to bear on the person 
in the first position so that they will relinquish this position to the next child in 
line, hence ‘second the best’. This means that maintaining the first position in the 
face of this pressure requires fortitude on the part of holder of this position. By 
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pressuring the first place holder to relinquish their position to them, the second 
place holder is consciously and willingly choosing the first place, knowing the 
pressure that will be brought to bear upon them by the other children in the line, if 
they are successful. The third place is described by the rhyme as a golden 
princess. Because all the girls want to be a princess, they covet this position. 
However, because the person holding this position is effectively feminised by the 
rhyme, any boy taking up this position in the line submits to the others’ teasing 
and moves into the fourth position; the dwarf. The implication for the fourth 
person in line is that they are positioned as someone with a physical disability, yet 
another undesirable position. Due to my severe undiagnosed short-sightedness, 
the metaphorical position I take up in my story of personal failure is ‘fourth the 
dwarf’, ironically, I am fourth in line as we wait for the teacher: 
Dwarf? The children all laugh at me because fourth place is where I’m 
standing. ‘Fourth the dwarf! Fourth the DWARF! Oooh yuck, you’re a 
daawarrrf!’. My toes curl in dismay… 
At that moment many discourses align and compete. At the time these were 
unspeakable and invisible: positions of power and education, historical and 
current colonising practices, privilege and disability.  
 
Step 3. Unique outcomes: Keeping on going 
For White (2002), unique outcomes or exceptions to the problem saturated 
personal story of failure are evidenced by any responses or actions (small or 
otherwise) that do not fit with, or refuse the expectations, norms and standards. 
These actions or responses can then be teased out into an alternative story line that 
does not fit with the locating of personal failure with/in the individual.  White 
(2005) states, “[a]s an outcome, the alternative story lines of people’s lives are 
thickened and more deeply rooted in history, the gaps are filled, and these story 
lines are clearly named” (p. 10). Drawing on White (2002), I pose the following 
question of my text: What made it possible for you to keep going in spite of these 
invitations to personal failure? 
 
I do not give myself a hard time for not knowing what to do, as I know that I am 
being asked to fulfil a task too big for me. In response to this I take up a position 
informed by strategising, deliberate disobedience, creativity and fun and ‘play at’ 
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conforming with the expectations of the teacher and the educational discourse. 
This knowing I hold on to makes it possible for me to continue and to strategise 
even when under pressure. In order to keep on going, I draw on a spirit of hope 
and bravado, and call on confidence to help me:  
With confidence I copy what I can see they are doing and write random, 
indecipherable ‘numbers’ and squiggles on my page too.  
White (2005) would describe this action of confidently copying what I think I see 
the others doing, and also taking artistic license to make up that which I cannot 
see, as a “unique outcome” (White, 2005, p.7), or sparkling moment in the 
narrative. At this moment I claim creativity as artistic licence in the movement of 
my identity. In terms of bodily knowing, I feel the relief of this unique outcome as 
I get on with my work in a creative, confident and purpose-full way.  
The effort…forces the tip of my tongue to follow the movement of my hand. 
Up…and…down and…around. Up…and…down…and…around….I clutch 
the new red pencil tightly. The shape of the pencil presses almost painfully 
into the fingers of my right hand. 
 
Step 4. Foundations of action: Antidote to failure – small but significant steps 
The kinds of questions White (2002) poses in this category are intended to get me 
to identify the actions I undertake in order to refuse the expectations, norms and 
standards of the educational discourse in this context. These achievements provide 
a platform for refusal for other aspects of socially constructed norms such as 
operations, processes, programmes, methods, procedures, measures, regimes and 
treatments associated with these. Calling on White (2002), I pose the following 
question of my text: What did you do that supported you in refusing this position 
call of failure? 
 
A series of small resistances lead up to the unique outcome that supports me in 
refusing the position call of failure. First, I resist the expectations of being 
obedient and compliant and following instructions silently and without complaint, 
by deliberately removing the focus of my attention away from the teacher and the 
despair I feel at not being able to do the set task made up of indecipherable 
writings on the blackboard. I daydream out of the window and imagine the feeling 
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of freedom if I could escape from the strictures of the classroom. This action 
brings me a moment of relief: 
Bored, I gaze out the window, willing myself out of the classroom.  
However, I cannot sustain this act of resistance in the face of the expectations of 
the teacher and the educational discourse and I step into a position of compliance 
as I do not want to take up a position of isolation and difference: 
I realise that the others are writing in their books with the pale blue and 
little faint squares on the pages. I don’t want to be left out, left behind.  
The pretending or playing at doing the assigned work can be construed as the 
second small refusal to take up the invitation of the educational discourse, or to 
position it as seriously as would be considered appropriate in this context. 
However, in spite of this I still take it seriously and endeavour to be 
…as neat on the page as possible. 
The creative additions, the embroidering of the ‘numbers’ and squiggles, that I 
inscribe into my book, and the firm and forceful pressing that I do, also represents 
an aspect of this initiative I take. The unique outcome emerges after I take the 
initiative and perform a careful, deliberate and secretive manoeuvring to take a 
‘cheating’ look, even though I am aware that this sort of behaviour is considered 
inappropriate in this setting. Then I call on confidence, the unique outcome, and 
copy what I think the others are doing: 
With confidence I copy what I can see they are doing and write random, 
indecipherable ‘numbers’ and squiggles on my page too.  
In an act of resistance to the position call of ‘dumbness’, I call on confidence to 
help reposition myself further away from the spectre of personal failure. This 
calling on confidence brings a moment of relief from personal failure for me.  
 
Step 5. Ethical substance - bottom line consideration 
This category of inquiry supports me in defining that which is articulated in the 
steps that I take to develop a foundation for the refusals towards the invitations of 
the educational discourse (White, 2002). Drawing on White (2002), I pose the 
following question of my text: What name would you give to what lies at the 




In the face of personal failure I take up the challenge and pull on the resources I 
have at my disposal: In particular, I find I can name confidence, creativity, 
imagination, independent thinking; an understanding of classroom etiquette and 
mores gleaned from my first year of school in New Zealand; and particular 
strategising skills. The desire to conform and to not be the odd one out also lies at 
the heart of this refusal of the invitation to personal failure. Strategically, I take a 
covert look at the other students’ work so as to not draw any unwanted attention 
to myself from either the students or the teacher or the students. Central to the 
interest and steps I take in standing up to personal failure and resisting the 
position call of dumbness and stupidity, is the decision I make that I am not 
stupid, and that I have to resist what I consider to be an unjust position call. Even 
under duress, I am able to call on confidence and apply myself proactively and 
productively to what I deduce is the task. Underpinning this confidence, lie 
resources such as the ability to take the initiative, to be proactive, to be creative, 
and to take a playful approach to a serious problem. This calling on confidence 
can, therefore, be construed as a significant step in standing up to my positioning 
as a failure by the modern power operating in this context.  
 
Step 6. Mode of subjectification - system of rules/body of values and principles 
At this point in the maps of inquiry, the questions focus on the bottom-line 
considerations and the questions in this category. These questions are designed to 
uncover key values and principles which might be accorded the status of ‘rules’ or 
‘laws of living’ that are “shaped by culture and class specific narratives about the 
‘good life’” (White, 2002, p. 59) for myself. Calling on White (2002), I pose the 
following question of my text: What key values and principles guided you in this 
expression of self-preservation? 
 
My resistance to this position of failure, speaks of a desire to want the best for 
myself. Therefore, this calling on confidence can be construed as an antidote to 
despair, and a sign of hope. At the heart of this resistance to being positioned as a 
failure by the educational discourse lies an expression of self-preservation or 
survival. I think this resistance represents evidence of agency on my part. At the 
core of this experience lies a valuing of confidence, creativity, deviousness, 
achievement, education, neatness, and self-reliance. By endeavouring to comply 
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with the educational expectations of success and productivity of the educational 
discourse, I take up a position that is informed by a valuing of working hard, as 
well as an obligation or responsibility to be seen to be doing what I am requested 
to do. I understand now that I take up the position call of the discourse to take 
responsibility for finishing tasks that I had been set. This is because I position my 
self in alignment with my family’s position in relation to the discourse of hard 
work.  
 
Step 7. Asceticism: Self- and relationship –forming activities 
In this category of inquiry, White’s questions concern identity formation through 
self- and relationship-forming activities and are intended to unpack efforts to 
become an ethical being. Drawing on White (2002), I posed the following 
question of my text: What is it like for you when you experienced this integrity 
and feeling in alliance with the work ethic?  
 
I experience this integrity and feeling in congruence with the work ethic of a hard 
working and virtuous person. This kind of person is valued and rewarded in 
society, and I looked to my family of origin for insight into this position of 
valuing the work ethic: both of my parents emigrated to New Zealand from 
Northern Ireland; my mother comes from a Protestant background; whereas my 
father was raised as a Catholic. As a reflection of the difference in their religious 
and cultural backgrounds, they each have a slightly different position in relation to 
the discourse of hard work. Growing up, this was confusing for me. Nevertheless, 
in analysing this six-year-old story, I can see evidence of a weaving of these two 
positions: I value and trust that hard work will produce rewards, regardless when 
they will come, resulting in a feeling of virtuousness and of being beyond 
reproach.  
 
Step 8. Telos - goal or desired end state  
In White’s final category of inquiry, questions are asked to establish aspirations 
for behaving as a moral being; what hopes and dreams a person has for his or her 
life, and the efforts made to act as an ethical being (White, 2002). Drawing on 
White (2002), I pose the following question of the text: What does this effort you 
made to better position yourself under difficult circumstances say about what 
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your life is about and about what you were hoping for your life? 
 
Upon closer examination, I can see that my story reveals that my identity as a 
learner involves taking up of multiple positions. This includes alignment with the 
work ethic, and the values of freedom, hope, playfulness, independent thinking, 
initiative, creativity and belonging. Non-normative positions I take up include 
deviousness and resistance to the position call of failure offered to me by the  
educational discourse. This demonstrates a valuing of self and a calling on 
courage under duress. In unpacking this story of personal failure and resistance to 
it I can see evidence of heeding a position call to hold onto hope and faith and 
trust in my skills and practices, even under duress, and to call on confidence for 
assistance to help me navigate and reposition myself in order to stand up to the 
position call of failure.  
 
Coda 
I revisited my six-year-old experience in order to analyse and unpack my early 
experience of failure. What I discover in the process is not a singular story of 
failure, but that there are many moments of success that I take up productively as 
a six-year-old. I discover, through the revisiting of one small failure story, a way 
of reviewing failure discourses and through this journey I experience a re-
positioning of my identity as a professional as I also recognize that the alternative 
story of my identity as a learner as a six-year-old was a storying of hope as I draw 
on strategies and knowledges that are available to me. This alternative non-failure 
storying of an identity as a learner opens up a position to take up creativity and 
resilience. As a result of this writing, I am now aware that I have options available 
to me that allow me to think of my self as not being done to, and that I can call on 
resourcefulness, and that while I make mistakes, I take steps to correct them. In 
the process of performing identity, I have demonstrated how identity is a verb, or 
a process of becoming, rather than a noun. Davies et al.., 2004, state that 
“[p]oststructural discourse entails a move from the self as a noun (and thus stable 
and relatively fixed) to the self as a verb, always in process, taking its shape in 
and through the discursive possibilities through which selves are made” (p. 368). 
While writing the story and using the maps for analysing the story I create space 
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to perform a new identity. I am aware, however, that identity is in a continual 
process of formation. The next chapter calls upon Deleuzo-Guattarian (1987) 
concepts to unpack movements in identity formation and explores the self as 




Chapter Six: Self as event 
 
The molar, the molecular and lines of flight 
In this chapter I use three Deleuzo-Guattarian (1987) interlinked concepts to 
unpack movements in identity, namely, the molar, the molecular, and lines of 
flight so as to shift position to see the worker self and patient self differently. First 
I investigate the molar at work in shaping a very focussed worker identity prior to 
the accident.  
 
The molar: The subject’s office 
The subject’s office is housed in a modernist-styled building which is itself a 
structure in service of the molarity as well as capitalist and neoliberalist practices 
within its walls. The building is, therefore, a physical representation/manifestation 
of the molar invitation to take up an identity as a worker. Deleuze and Guattari’s 
(1987, p. 365) theorising provides a way of thinking about the linkage between 
physical space, namely modernist architectural environment, and capitalism and 
neoliberalism. Ellsworth (2005) states that this way of understanding architecture 
as connected to the people who inhabit it, conceives of this intersection as a: 
“place of joining [which] creates a membrane where the brain/mind/body and the 
‘outside world’ touch and interpenetrate, flow into and interfuse each other” (p. 
48). Davies et al.. (2009, p. 133) explain how, from a Deleuzian perspective of 
architecture, the inside of building represents a folding in of the outside of the 
building. Deleuze and Guattari (1987, p. 365) conceive architecture as 
fundamentally connected to rigid/striated molar lines of force, which boxes the 
individual into a particular way of working. From this perspective, architecture, 
and particularly modernist architecture, can be seen to reflect the rigid striations 
of the molar entities that produced it, namely capitalism and neoliberalism. As 
such, modernist architecture generates molar lines of force to produce the worker 
through the striations of its structure and operations. These limitations and 
boundaries operate to pull the worker away from nomadic smooth space (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1987, p. 381) to a fixed place where capitalistic and neoliberalistic 
discursive expectations can determine appropriate worker behaviour. The 
subject’s modernist workplace calls her into a capitalist idea of what constitutes a 
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worker, and she has taken up this invitation. However, accepting this invitation 
has resulted in the subject becoming highly stressed, and she is experiencing 
burnout.  
 
A typical day experienced by the subject presented below illustrates how molar 
lines of force emanate from the molar entities of capitalism and neoliberalism 
through lines of force generated by the architecture, and practices in the work 
environment that have led to this situation, and affects the subject’s behaviour, 
body, and life. 
 
Her typical day 
Her typical day begins at 7am when the alarm goes off. She gets up and performs 
her ablutions, which involve washing and drying her carefully styled hair and the 
application of expensive facial products and makeup. After breakfast she dresses 
in a fine wool navy tailored suit teamed with sheer tights and black mid-heeled 
pumps and a silk cream blouse. She wears a pearl necklace around her neck, and 
matching clip-on pearl earrings and her wedding band and diamond ring on her 
left ring finger. These clothes and accessories are deliberate choices and support 
her professional becoming as an advertising sales consultant for a fashion 
publication in the city. Her job involves meeting with (and impressing) people 
from high-end designer clothing boutiques. Meadmore et al. (2010) write about 
how a set of clothes can be an example of how the body and power/knowledge 
come together in “strict codes of regulation” (p. 467). Capitalist discursive molar 
lines of force expect the subject’s self inscription/choice of attire (a visible sign of 
her alignment with these lines of force) to be impeccable and without flaw. She 
takes up this form of power/knowledge and is granted certain freedoms by the 
company.  
 
Her subjection to the discursive lines of force invests her with the power to be 
taken seriously by her clients, who are also constrained and trained by the molar 
to understand the criteria she is subjected to and, therefore, expect this standard of 
presentation of her. This means that the clients will invest trust in her and 
purchase advertising space in the publication she represents. However, at this time 
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the New Zealand economy and marketplace are experiencing a recession, and 
because businesses are spending less on advertising, companies, like the one the 
subject works, for are making less profit. In this context, the company is 
dependent upon advertising sales consultants, such as she, to generate revenue 
that will ensure that it survives these tough economic times. She has integrated 
this pressure to sell into her becoming worker-self, and so takes seriously the sales 
targets that have been set for her by the company. 
 
She collects her shiny, black, leather briefcase and walks calculatedly down the 
hill to the shopping centre where she queues to catch the 8am bus into the city. 
This queuing is a physical manifestation of the molar line of force that expects 
that she will wait to board in an orderly and obedient manner that will not disturb 
the bus driver’s schedule. This schedule dovetails into other bus routes and fits in 
with the other bus routes and the service is dependent upon all the drivers 
adhering to the expectations of the molar lines of force arising out of the 
discourses that expect that workers will arrive at their workplaces on time.  
 
She sits in the bus as it makes its slow journey into the city. She studiously avoids 
making eye contact with the other passengers in the bus, even though they are 
seated beside and in front of her. She is lucky to have a seat, and the standing 
commuters sway as they grip the leather straps that descend from the ceiling of 
the bus. Her stop approaches and she presses the buzzer to disembark. She quickly 
descends from the bus and walks briskly along the city sidewalk. Molar lines of 
force also constrain the subject and the other commuters so nobody smiles, and 
nobody dawdles. Even though the pavement is congested with other commuters 
who are all walking just as quickly and purposefully as she, molar lines of force 
ensure that she (and they) all carefully avoid colliding with one another. She 
arrives at the entrance of a large dark brown modernist building, the entrance of 
which is set right on the street. The building is built of steel reinforced concrete 
and is eight storeys high. Mirrored glass windows prevent anyone on the outside 
seeing inside the building, yet the workers inside can still see out. Molar 
capitalistic entities expect that business transactions be occluded from the passers-
by, as this is a private (and legal) business entity and the transactions happening 
here are considered to be of no public concern.  
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She hurries through the large doors set in the minimalist and unadorned frontage 
into a large foyer. She is on time, as lateness is construed by her superiors (and 
colleagues) as unprofessional, and she also wishes to align with the molar lines of 
expectation of efficiency, and positioning that ‘time is money’. In line with this 
impetus she moves quickly up the short flight of stairs to the entrance of the open 
plan office where she works. The fluorescent tubes shine down on her as she 
moves with confidence through the crowded office. The workers sit at triangular 
shaped desks in groupings of four, like segments of an orange. This particular 
configuration of seating arrangement is considered to be the most efficient use of 
the available office space. The cubicles are separated by low partitions covered in 
a muddy beige carpet-like material. The walls of the office space are also painted 
beige, the focus is on operating an efficient and profitable business. Workers here 
are peripatetic and tend to visit their clients at their businesses, so the company 
does not consider interior design to be a useful expenditure. However, each 
worker has personalised their cubicle with their personal effects, such as small 
pictures, plants and stuffed animals. 
 
As she walks to her cubicle, the subject tilts her head up and her shoulders back to 
create an impression of confidence. The company as a molar entity expects that 
she is an autonomous, self-interested individual who understands that the elusive 
advertising dollar is in hot demand and that she will always act in the company’s 
best interest to beat other media outlets vying for the dollar so as to increase its 
market share, and therefore increase profit. The subject turns into the last cubicle 
on the right and sits down at her desk. She immediately pushes her office chair 
back on its wheels. She picks up the phone on her desk and puts the receiver to 
her ear, which she tucks under her chin. She picks up a biro and taps it on the desk 
pad on her desk. She runs her finger down her ‘To Do’ list in front of her – that 
she has written just before 5pm the day before. Molar lines expect good time 
management skills, and she is organised and focused on the business of selling 
advertising, and making a profit for the company. She taps a number onto her 
push button phone, speaks into the phone and, at times, laughs loudly. Her 
workmates look up when she does this. Some frown, and keep working, others do 
not appear to notice. As she makes her morning phone calls, she doodles and 
drums with her pen as she talks.  
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Occasionally she makes a note in her diary. She frowns, which reflects her level 
of concentration as she communicates with her client on the other end of the 
phone. The molar lines of force expect that she will conform with the striations in 
this setting; she is expected to apply herself to her work without supervision, and 
limit her propensity to socialise. She conforms to the molar expectations, and so 
does not look up at the other three people who are seated across the low cubicle 
walls from her as they also talk on their phones, drink coffee, chat to each other, 
or fill out forms. Eventually, she hangs up the phone.  
 
Her constrained, professional worker identity is neatly packaged in this modernist 
and functional space. Her work ethic and feminist idealism are captured in this 
web of neoliberalist individualism, competition, and efficiency. At the molar 
level, the striations of the workspace and the discourses of capitalism and 
neoliberalism, combined with the work ethic, are all neatly packaged up and 
folded into her becoming-worker identity and she is positioned by the discourses 
as a successful and professional advertising sales executive.  
 
Molecular lines 
The subject’s drumming with the biro, the laughing (too loudly) on the phone, and 
the doodling represent small molecular movements away from the lines of molar 
force, as this capitalistic and neoliberalistic molar context prefers professionalism, 
calm, order, quiet and efficiency. If she were to catch a glimpse of her co-
worker’s grimaces as she laughs (too loudly) she would restrain this, which 
represents a reterrorialisation of the molecular resistant line. That the subject and 
her co-workers have attempted to personalise and beautify their cubicles with 
small pictures, stuffed animals and plants signals a small molecular line of 
resistance to the beige and dreary workplace surroundings. Although these small 
creative acts are tolerated by the molar power structure, the moment that the 
subject or one of her co-workers were to introduce more obtrusive personal 
effects, management (representing and embodying the molar lines of force) would 
discipline this behavior. Here, expressions of individuality are tolerated only as 
long as they do not distract the workers from their daily tasks which promote and 




The subject leaves the building, she walks to the company carpark. She allocated 
company car and drives out into the traffic. She’s on her way to an important 
appointment out of town.  
 
 
Rear Screen Mirrors 
 
You are slumped over; suspended by your seatbelt. The low sound is your 
groaning. You stop. You try to move... You stop moving... 
A breeze comes through the driver’s window. Someone shouts: “Are you OK? 
Are you OK?”.  A moan comes from somewhere. Your eyes are shut. 
 
Time passes.   
 
 “I’ve rung the ambulance. You’ve been in a car accident.” You are on the windy 
road to school. You walk along the road on your way to school. The chilly 
southerly moans through the black spiky branches of the pines across the road. 
“Who can we call? Who can we call? Your family?” You mumble your husband’s 
number… You walk along the road on your way to school… The sky is dark. The 
chilly southerly moans through the black spiky branches of the pines across the 
road.  
 
Time passes.  
 
Someone is in the passenger seat: “I am a doctor.” …  You push your body up. 
“No! Don’t move!”  She presses you back into the seat. You shove your weight 
upwards. You reach out and grasp the rear vision mirror in your left hand. You 
twist it towards your face… 
 
Where are you? Where have you gone? Where is your face? 
 
You do not exist. You are erased. You are a blank cipher. You are a zero.  
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You are not dreaming. 
 
Panic… Whathaveyoudone…whathaveyoudone… “Don’t panic”. You stop 
chanting.  
 
The groan stops.  
 
Time passes.  
 
Sirens in the distance… louder and louder, and then, stop... “What is your 
name?”; “Can you hear me?” You make no sound. “If you can hear me, squeeze 
my hand.” Your hand moves, slightly… You don’t speak.  The ambulance men 
extricate you from the car. Your eyes are shut. Your head flops to the side. You 
walk along the road on your way to school… The sky is dark. The chilly southerly 
moans through the black spiky branches of the pines across the road. You walk 
along the road on your way to school… The sky is dark. The chilly southerly 







Six months after the accident. You sit in the surgeon’s room. There is a large 
expanse of desk. He leans across to tell you that you have to wait until the 
swelling goes down before you can have the second operation. 
 
Your eyes follow him as he crosses the room to retrieve a large folder of slides 
from the shelf. He riffles through them trying to locate the one he has promised 
you for your records. He holds them up to the light. 
 
You get up and limp over to him. You stand beside him. You look at the slides. 
One slide has an image of something that looks like a rather large piece of rump 
steak. You look at it. You tilt your head. You squint. You look at him. He looks 
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back at you. He speaks: “Ummm, you’re not supposed to see that…It’s what your 
face looks like during surgery… This is the slide I used at the conference and …”. 
You stare. You see yourself. Red, meaty slide is your face… Who are you? Where 
have you gone? How would anyone know you without your face?  
 
Your hands go up to your face. Your fingers find it. You have a face. You slip in 
and out of yourself ... you are tenuous and slippery. You are slipping out of your 
own grasp. 
 
You grasp to hold onto a memory of the face before the accident. You search for 
the photo in your handbag. The face you know. The face you want to resurrect. A 
face you know. How do you find your old face to speak itself before you got 
shattered to mush? 
 
The room swims.  
 
This man and his surgical team saw your non-self. The surgeons at the conference 
saw your non-self, too. Where were you when you became a non-self? They saw 
you without a self, without a face. 
 
You sit down. His words drift: “…for this operation we will make an ‘Alice-band’ 
incision across your head so that your face could be pulled away from your skull 
to harvest more bone from your cranium. This procedure will correct the 
enopthalmos, or posterior displacement of your left eye, which has given it a 
sunken appearance...”  
 








Who Are You? In the Hand Mirror 
 
Time passes.  
 
You recover from the second operation.  
 
You pick the mirror up, put it down, pick it up and put it down… The third time 
you pick it up and bring it closer. You look in the hand mirror. You look for a 
familiar self. 
 
You see a swollen face. Your heart misses a beat. 
 
Your cheekbones do not exist. Your nostrils are asymmetrical. Your nose hard 
and beak-like. You stare at the person looking at you from the mirror. You look 




Your dream of becoming a television news presenter will never come true. You 
will not be in front of a camera… ever. 
 
Emptiness fills you. You cannot see a way out. 
 
You mourn. You have become other than you were. 
 
You have destroyed your face. Nothing will ever be the same again. You have 
destroyed a self. You do not want to live like this.  
 
You will always be disfigured. You are a mess.  
 
You hate the way you look. 
 
You writ(h)e in agony.  
 
 78 
You are exhausted.  
 
You do not want to live a stranger’s life. 
 
You do not have the guts to end it. 
 
Who are you? Who to become?  
 
What to become? 
 
 
A Little Clown Nose 
 
Eighteen months after the accident.  
 
You are once again waiting in the surgeon’s waiting room. This time, you will 
stand up for yourself.  
 
You open your bag. You take out your little mirror. You scowl into it. Gingerly 
you finger the long hard piece of bone that they have harvested from your skull 
that is held on at the bridge of your nose with a titanium screw and extends to the 
tip of your nose.  
 
Your name is called. It is your turn in the surgeon’s office. You take your seat 
across the wide desk from him. He asks you how you are. You point at your nose 
and tell him that you always break it when you knock it on things, or when the 
dog accidently knocks it with her long pointy snout. You touch your nose. You 
ask him to cut off the bone halfway down and replace it with a piece of cartilage. 
 
He waits impassively for you to finish.  
 
“Oh, no”, he says, “I can’t do that”. 
 
Your new face crumples. 
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He speaks slowly as if providing space for you to catch up with him: “because it 
will ruin the look of your nose”. 
 
You frown, you look down at your hands.  
 
“Look”, he says, becoming impatient, “do you want a little clown nose, is that 
what you want?”  Clearly he is proud of the aesthetics of his creation. 
 
You shake your heard. You don’t want a little clown nose. 
 
You take a deep breath and open your mouth to speak. Nothing comes out. You 
swallow. You open your mouth again. The words come stuttering out. You point 
at the crookedness of your nostrils. You ask whether anything can be done to 
correct this asymmetry.  
 
He steeples his hands and studies you carefully across his desk. Slowly he places 
his hands on his desk and pushes himself to standing. He asks you to tilt your 
head up. You comply. You study the ceiling.  
 
He moves around the desk to stand beside you. Without asking, he takes your chin 
in his hand. He moves your head to the left and then to the right. You study the 
ceiling. Your head moves left to right to left. You study the ceiling. You sit still. 
You study the ceiling. 
 
He releases your head. He moves back to his seat and sits back down at his desk. 
He looks across the desk at you, and sits back in his chair. He delivers his edict: 
“The external septum is notched from the apex of the right nostril to the base of 
the left nostril. I suggest you need another procedure to correct the asymmetry of 
the left nostril”.  
 
Your shoulders relax. You take a breath. You nod.  
 
He says he will make the arrangements. 
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You sit in the car. You examine your nose in the rear-vision mirror. You look at 
your nostrils. You press your nose. It resists the pressure. It does not move.  
A hard beak nose breaks and gets in the way. 
 





Lines of Flight 
 
You wake up.  
 
You move slowly. You carefully get out of bed.  
 
You look at the clock. It is 10am.  
 
The house is still and silent.  
 
You draw the curtains. It is a sunny day outside.  
 
You turn and study the room. You look at the full-length mirror hanging on the 
wall across the room from you.  
 
You slowly and deliberately move over to the full-length mirror. 
 
This is the moment you have been putting off ever since you arrived back from 
hospital yesterday. 
 
You swallow hard. You turn your head to look deeply into the mirror.  
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Your eyes widen. You stop breathing. 
 
Your face is still swollen.  
 
Your nose is still crooked and your nostrils are still asymmetrical. 
 
You start to hyperventilate. 
 
You stagger away from the mirror. You lean on the end of the bed. Your head 
hangs down. You groan as if in great pain. 
 
You start to form words but they do not escape the confines of your mouth.  
 
You start to cry. 
 
You tip your head back and howl with anguish. 
 
The reflection in the mirror mimics your every move. 
 
Out of the corner of your eye you catch a glimpse of your face in the mirror. 
 
Your face is distorted and red. Your mouth is a gaping black hole. The swelling 
looks worse. 
 
The crying stops. 
 
You mutter to yourself under your breath. 
 
You fling your arms out wide and you roar at the top of your lungs. 
 
The roaring stops.  
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You limp as quickly as you can to the kitchen. You locate the telephone book 
under the phone. You flip through the pages until you come to the ‘Plastic 
Surgeon’. 
 
The pen circles names in the directory. 
 
Time passes.  
 
 
Rear Screen Mirrors: Self as event 
In the story Rear Screen Mirrors the subject is suddenly, in an affective moment, 
deterritorialised from the familiar territory of a healthy and intact body. In this 
moment, she becomes unmoored from her uninjured body, her-self. She is also 
deterritorialised out of consciousness into a dream scape/space.  
You are on the windy road to school. You walk along the road on your 
way to school. The chilly southerly moans through the black spiky 
branches of the pines across the road.  
In the dream she traverses the familiar road to school. The sky is dark and 
ominous. Time differences and seasons change. In the dream it is early evening, 
and the season is winter. It is cold and the wind moans. The repetition of the 
dream scene, interspersed with the space of the company car, an extension of her 
worker identity, represents the going in and out of consciousness/dream space, to 
another nomadic space of an accident scene.  The car is a wreck – the front is 
stoved in and the engine has been shunted forward to shatter her left patella. 
Disoriented, she hangs upside down, which adds to the sense of a radical shift in 
position and territory for her. 
You are slumped over; suspended by your seatbelt. The low sound is your 
groaning. You stop. You try to move... You stop moving... 
In the moment of the impact she is reduced to an accident victim in need of rescue 
by the emergency services. She is no longer physically intact: her body is broken; 
all the bones in her face except her jawbone are pulverised; she is concussed; her 
left kneecap is smashed; and her neck, chest, neck and left ankle are broken.  
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When the subject regains consciousness, she becomes aware that someone is 
sitting beside her in the passenger seat. This person is a medical practitioner who 
holds a position of specialised knowledge and embodies the molar biomedical 
discourse. The doctor instructs her not to move: 
 “I am a doctor.” …  You push your body up. “No! Don’t move!”  She 
presses you back into the seat. 
The doctor is speaking from a position of care, which demonstrates how the molar 
makes possible connections with others, and how to be in the world. Reaching for 
the rear vision mirror is not in a molecular move of resistance against the molar 
by the subject, rather, it is evidence of the power of affect - she is compelled to 
see it: 
…You shove your weight upwards. You reach out and grasp the rear 
vision mirror in your left hand. You twist it towards your face… 
She encounters her altered (damaged and bloody) image in the mirror, yet she 
cannot “see” it: 
You reach out and grasp the rear vision mirror in your left hand. You twist 
it towards your face… 
Where are you? Where have you gone? Where is your face? 
You do not exist. You are erased. You are a blank cipher. You are a zero.  
You are not dreaming. 
In this moment of gazing upon her non-self, she receives the first shock of an 
absent self, or an un-becoming. This affective experience deterritorialises her 
from both this damaged, unrecognisable self, and her familiar self. The power of 
this affect is illustrated by the fact that even though the scars and damage from her 
face impacting on the steering wheel are still visible today, the image reflected 
back in the rear vision mirror cannot be re-membered.  
 
This continuing affective moment of gazing upon her un-becoming self signals a 
second moment of deterrorialisation, as her brain cannot comprehend the sheer 
horror of what is being reflected back to it. This moment produces the affect of 
un-becoming, or separating, or deterritorialisation from the image of the face 
seen/not seen in the rear screen mirror: 
Where is your face? Where are you? Where have you gone? 
You do not exist. You are erased. You are a blank cipher. You are a zero.  
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The consequence of this affective and visceral moment of deterritorialisation of 
un-becoming or disappearing from view results in a rising sense of panic:  
Panic… Whathaveyoudone…whathaveyoudone… “Don’t panic”. You stop 
chanting.  
The subject stifles the panic and accepts the striations of the medico-scientific 
discourse. She reterritorialises into line with the molar lines of the discourse and 
takes up the position call of obedience by the doctor. This represents a valuing of 
compliance with authority in the face of adversity that the biomedical-scientific 
discourse holds.  
 
Post-Accident: Reterritorialisation 
Further reterritorialisation into the new molar territory of the bio-medical 
discursive space occurs in the six months after the accident and her first 
reconstructive surgery. She is acclimatised away from a worker-identity, 
becoming an ACC beneficiary and patient. She knows physiotherapy, and has 
learned to walk again. She adjusts to a new routine, which involves not working, 
more sleep, visits to various specialists, hospital staff, psychologists, psychiatrists, 
and dealings with ACC case managers. She is offered, and accepts the position of 
non-expert in the face of these specialists. She is familiar with, and re-
territorialized into the new territory of the biomedical discursive realm. She hears 
a new specialised medial language that the surgeon uses: 
. …for this operation we will make an ‘Alice-band’ incision across your 
head so that your face could be pulled away from your skull to harvest 
more bone from your cranium. This procedure will correct the 
enopthalmos, or posterior displacement of your left eye, which has given it 
a sunken appearance...” 
She takes up a position of a charming and obedient patient to best convince the 
specialists to repair her face so she can again look familiar to her-self again. 
 
Slide Show: Self as event 
In this story the subject is in the middle of an appointment with the plastic and 
reconstructive surgeon who has performed the first major reconstructive surgery 
on her face. A pivotal and affective moment occurs for her when she inadvertently 
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sees a slide of her face in the process of being operated on. 
One slide has an image of something that looks like a rather large piece 
of rump steak. You look at it. You tilt your head. You squint. You look at 
him. He looks back at you. He seems embarrassed. He speaks: “Ummm, 
you’re not supposed to see that…It’s what your face looks like during 
surgery… This is the slide I used at the conference and …”. 
In this moment of non-recognition, the subject experiences a visceral and 
immediate sense of affect. She literally sees what lies beneath her face, the flesh 
and bones: 
You stare. This is what you look like with your face off. Red, meaty slide 
is your face… 
 Your hands go up to your face. Your fingers find it. You have a face…. 
This seeing produces a line of flight that deterritorialises her away from her face. 
She un-becomes her face and becomes what lies beneath; flesh and bone and 
blood. This seeing also brings about a becoming aware that what lies beneath her 
face is a fleshy and bony structure, common to all other humans.  
 
This sudden and shocking moment of lack of recognition of what is so taken-for-
granted represents a significant movement in un-becoming of the molar 
face/identity. This unmooring of identity, this seeing beneath the surface of the 
skin to the bones, deterritorialises and unmoors the subject from the familiar 
terrain of identity: 
Who are you? Where have you gone? How would anyone know you 
without your face?... 
 You slip in and out of yourself ... you are tenuous and slippery. You are 
slipping out of your own grasp…. 
On this trajectory, she is strange to her self, and because she no longer recognises 
herself, she deterritorialises, and as a result, identity becomes mutable, tenuous 
and un-fixed: 
Your face is strange…You grasp to hold onto a memory of the face 
before the accident. You search for the photo in your handbag. The face 
you know. The face you want to resurrect. A face you know. 
 How do you get your old face to speak itself? How do you find your 
face to speak itself before you got shattered to mush? 
 86 
The face on the slide is forbidden territory for a patient. This power/knowledge is 
not meant for her eyes. The intended audience for the slide are the plastic and 
reconstructive surgeons attending an Australasian conference. This image with her 
face off will have been projected onto a large screen in front of hundreds of 
complete strangers.  
This man and his surgical team saw your non-self. The surgeons at the 
conference have seen your non-self, too. No one knows your non-self. 
Where were you when you became a non-self? They saw you without a 
self, without a face. 
As she bears witness to what lies beneath her face, she deterritorialises into the 
slippery and forbidden territory of the slide and what it represents – namely the 
power/knowledge of the biomedical discourse, and her relatively powerless and 
knowledge-poor position in relation to it. She becomes malleable and plastic to 
herself and free to take up an artistic approach to the reconstruction of her face.  
Seen from this position, her face is re-make-able to how she desires. This 
produces a reterritorialisation onto the molar line of the biomedical discourse and 
established ways of thinking identity and face. She reaches for the photograph in 
her bag to look at as a reminder her of what she has lost and wishes to regain: 
You search for the photo in your handbag. The face you know. The face 
you want to resurrect. A face you know. How do you find your old face to 
speak itself before you got shattered to mush? 
 
The medical gaze 
In this story the subject is subjected to the objectifying medical gaze, as embodied 
in the surgeon. Of interest is that the doctor in his clinic represents a “science on 
the exercise and decisions of the gaze” (Foucault, 1973, p. 89). However, this 
medical gaze is different to the mere gaze of an observer, as it is the gaze of 
measurement and evaluation of 
a doctor supported and justified by an institution, that of a doctor endowed 
with the power of decisions and intervention…it was a gaze that was not 
content to observe what was self-evident, it must make it possible to 
outline chances and risks; it was calculating. (Foucault, 1973, p. 89) 
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The patient is “now required to be the object of a gaze, indeed, a relative object, 
since what was being deciphered in him [is] seen as contributing to a better 
knowledge of others” (Foucault, 1973, p. 83). He states that: 
The medical gaze must therefore travel along a path that had not so far 
been opened to it: vertically from the symptomatic surface to the tissual 
surface; in depth, plunging from the manifest to the hidden; and in both 
directions, as it must continuously travel if one wishes to define, from one 
end to the other, the network of essential necessities. (Foucault, 1973, p. 
135) 
Foucault (1973) would argue that the subject’s seeing of what lies beneath her 
skin contravenes the rules of the biomedical discourse that generally maintains a 
strict hierarchy as to what can be seen, by whom. The medical practitioner’s gaze 
is privileged over that of the patient’s. The aim of this analysis is therefore, an 
attempt to “grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution of [my self 
as] subject” (Foucault, 1980, p. 97). Experiencing this becoming (in relation with 
this surgeon) as a process of powerlessness, provides valuable impetus to trouble 
the power disparity that exists between positioning the therapist as expert, and 
positioning the client as not expert. 
 
Where’s the rest of me? 
This affective moment of the subject seeing beneath her face, reminds me of 
Massumi’s (2002, pp 52-57) analysis of Ronald Reagan’s experience of affect 
when he had a sense of having lost a part of himself when acting the role of a 
young man who awakens to find that the lower half of his body has been 
amputated. In this moment Reagan becomes other to himself, rather like the 
subject of my stories, and he deterritorialises to find the rest of himself. 
Intriguingly, the catalyst of perceiving himself to have lost the lower half of him 
self, deterritorialises Reagan from his idea of him self as intact. His journey 
reterritorialises on right-wing political terrain, and culminates in his 
transformation into the president of the United States. Massumi (2002) explains 
that Reagan’s imagined, yet ‘real and actual’ 
transformation from one bodily state (characterized by mobility, the ability 
to walk) to a radically different one (characterized by stasis, being 
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bedridden) [means that] Reagan must embody the scene of a man 
recognizing himself as irretrievably changed, as having been transported 
in total darkness and, unbeknown to himself, from one perspective on life 
to another that is irreconcilably different… Then he learns to cross from 
one of those perspectives to the other by multiplying relative perspectives 
on the event that they delimit but do not contain: the accident, by which 
the self becomes other than it was. (Massumi, 2002, pp. 53-54) 
Massumi describes this process of becoming for Reagan as a process of inventing 
a technology of the event of this loss of part of himself, which is “also a 
technology of the self, and a technologizing of the self” (2002, p.55). This means 
that in the moment of seeing the 
blankness at his waist, he is only emotion. He is nowhere, in darkness. He 
is in an in-between space composed of accumulated movements bled into 
one another and folding in upon the body… He will find a method that 
will take this new self, semitechnologized through acting, through a 
similar transformation, after which he will feel it to be complete. 
(Massumi, 2002, p. 57) 
There are uncanny similarities of my own experience to Reagan’s experience of 
dis-location of self, as related by Massumi. The sense of being in-between, of 
dislocation and liminality that arise as a consequence of the loss of face, I 
experience as striking. That Reagan responds by setting out to find the missing 
part of himself resonates strongly with my experience, although his choice of 
direction differs significantly from mine. He becomes the vehicle for the delivery 
of the neoliberal economic agenda in the Western world, after career, whereas I 
embark upon a course that traverses the terrain of education and counselling.  
 
Who are You?: Self as event 
In the story Who are You? the subject is recovering from the second major 
reconstructive surgery on her face, a year after the accident. The surgeon has once 
again resected her face from her skull to continue the reconstructing of her facial 
bones. This operation has involved harvesting cranial bones to supply the material 
to build up the structure of her face. She is been looking forward to seeing an 
improvement in her appearance after this surgery. However, she becomes nervous 
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in the moments leading up to looking at herself in the mirror. She is nervous 
because she has placed a great deal of faith in the surgeon to restore and rebuild 
her/face. She hopes that he has corrected the sunken appearance of her left eye, 
the asymmetry of her nostrils and the lack of cheekbones. She calls on courage to 
look at he new face in the mirror: 
You pick the mirror up, put it down, pick it up and put it down… The third 
time you pick it up and bring it closer. You look in the hand mirror. You 
look for a familiar self. 
Unfortunately, this new face is a disappointment to the subject, as she cannot see 
any improvement in her appearance: 
You see a swollen face. Your heart misses a beat. 
Your cheekbones do not exist. Your nostrils are asymmetrical. Your nose 
hard and beak-like 
She is still un-becoming. The surgery has not worked to reincarnate her facial 
identity. She remains positioned as other to herself: 
You stare at the person looking at you from the mirror. You look away… 
she looks away… You stare, she stares. You lower the hand mirror… 
In this moment of disappointment she deterritorialises, or enters what Michael 
White (1997) would describe as a liminal stage in the migration of identity. This 
liminal stage is characterised by an overwhelming sense of fear of the unknown as 
she detaches from a familiar sense of the self and feels at a loss. She no longer has 
a sense of well-being or trust in the world and, as a result, feels disorientated. This 
stage of liminality can also be described as a mourning phase, characterised by 
desperation, disorientation, confusion and despair. That the subject is deeply 
distressed is evidence of this liminality: 
You mourn. You have become other than you were. 
You have destroyed your face. Nothing will ever be the same again. You 
have destroyed a self. You do not want to live like this.  
She discovers in this moment that she is still strange to herself – she is still 
deterritorialised from her elusive self/face that she yearns for be re-
territorialisation to. She cannot bear to carry on, yet: 
You do not want to live a stranger’s life. 
You do not have the guts to end it. 
The sense of grief leaving behind the old face and reaching past grief towards a 
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new unfamiliar shore brings to mind Roland Barthes’ (1977) story La côtelette 
(The rib chop) where he recounts how a part of one of his ribs was removed in an 
extraplueral pneumothorax operation and how, after the surgery, it was formally 
returned to him wrapped in gauze, as if the surgeons were saying that his body 
belonged to him: “in whatever disembodied state they restored [it]…” (1977, p. 
61). The story continues with what Barthes ended up doing with his body:  
For a long time I kept this fragment of myself in a drawer, …not knowing 
quite what to do with it, not daring to get rid of it lest I do some harm to 
my person, though it was utterly useless to me shut up in a desk amongst 
such ‘precious’ objects as old keys, a schoolboy report card, my 
grandmother B’s mother-of-pearl dance program and pink taffeta card 
case. And then one day, realizing that the function of any drawer is to 
erase, to acclimatize the death of objects…but not going so far as to dare 
cast this bit of myself into the common refuse of my building, I flung the 
ribchop and its gauze from my balcony, as if I were romantically 
scattering my own ashes, into the rue Servandoni, where some dog would 
come and sniff them out. (1979, p. 61)  
The pain of not having any choice forces the subject to face this new face she is 
stuck with.  The subject has to let go of old face and get to know this new, 
unfamiliar and unsatisfactory face. She is forced to reterritorialise on territory she 
does not want to. This reterritorialisation generates questions for the subject: 
 Who are you? Who to become?  
What to become? 
What can a face do? 
These questions signal a movement of reterritorialisation out of a place of despair 
as the subject faces the now unavoidable question as to how to become who she 
sees in the mirror, in order to become an identity. Her old identity has become 
undone or decomposed.  
 
This concept of decomposition is used by Barthes (1977) to describe a 
dismantling of bourgeois consciousness. For the purpose of my study, however, 
decomposition is used to conceive of a physical decomposition of face/self, and 
unmooring of identity pre- and post-accident. In the process “I scrape, catch and 
drag” (Barthes, 1977, p. 63) my-self as a post-structural subject-in-process 
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(Davies et al.., 2006, p. 181) of finding identity. As a poststructuralist researcher, 
I find myself scratching and dragging at Barthes’ (1979) words, actions and 
writing in order to make visible this becoming or migration of identity for the 
subject-self as she faces the grief of unbecoming, of losing face. Up until the point 
of this story she, too, has kept the hope of restoration of the old face in a 
metaphorical drawer, for fear of letting go of the memory of the face.   
 
A Little Clown Nose: Self as event 
At the start of story A Little Clown Nose, the subject has once again decided to 
take a molecular line of resistance against the molar line of force: 
You are once again waiting in the surgeon’s waiting room. This time, you will 
stand up for yourself.  
You open your bag. You take out your little mirror. You scowl into it. Gingerly 
you finger the long hard piece of bone that they have harvested from your skull 
that is held on at the bridge of your nose with a titanium screw and extends to 
the tip of your nose.  
This decision to stand up for her-self represents a small movement of resistance 
and shift of position in relation to the molar lines of force emanating from the 
biomedical discourse, which maintains that the surgeon is the expert and the 
patient is not. Buchanan (1997) suggests that the Deleuzo-Guattarian question, 
what can a body do? produces possibilities for lines of flight. In this context of the 
surgeon’s room, the body of the subject is dependent upon the surgeon to fix her 
damaged face, and he has to be in agreement with this vision she has. However he 
works within different limitations and has other ideas for her face:  
 He waits impassively for you to finish.  
“Oh, no”, he says, “I can’t do that”. 
Your new face crumples. 
He speaks slowly as if providing space for you to catch up with him: “it will 
ruin the look of your nose”. 
You say you don’t care about the look. You talk to convince him.  
“Look”, he says, becoming impatient, “do you want a little clown nose, is that 
what you want?”  Clearly he is proud of the aesthetics of his creation. 
In this context what the subject’s body can do is limited by the relationship it has 
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with the surgeon. He will not perform the procedure she wants, and this refusal 
operates as a molar line of force to deflect her resistant molecular line. Through 
the surgeon’s deflection, the subject’s molecular line of resistance is 
reterritorialised back onto the molar line. The body which is produced through 
systems of relations (Tucker, 2006) is thwarted and disciplined: 
“No.” You say. You don’t want a little clown nose. 
You take a deep breath and open your mouth to speak. Nothing comes out. You 
swallow. You open your mouth again. The words come stuttering out. You point 
at crookedness of your nostrils. You ask whether anything can be done to 
correct this asymmetry.  
The force of the biomedical discourse is demonstrated in the surgeon’s behaviour 
towards the subject. Once she has agreed with him that she does not want a little 
clown nose, she is brought into alignment with his plan for the on-going 
reconstruction of her face.  
 
Line of Flight: Self as event 
Before the accident the subject had plans for becoming a television journalist. 
However, the accident stymies this desire. Rushton, (2002) argues, that a face 
reshapes the world so that we perceive it differently, anew. Deleuze (1994), and 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987), consider the face in terms of the emergence of 
"possible worlds"; and interpret the virtuality of the face in terms of our relations 
with others – other people, as well as things in the world. The possible new 
worlds available to her via her face pre-accident look very different to the options 
post-accident. Before the accident she has plans on becoming a television 
journalist and presenter. After the accident, she considers herself too disfigured to 
contemplate this option. However, even though some options are shut down after 
the accident, other possibilities open up the space to change her identity. This 
process occurs over time. Because she becomes other to herself in the moment of 
seeing the non-self in the mirror after re-gaining consciousness, she enters into a 
realm of possibility, of possible connections, expectations, creations. In short, she 




For Deleuze (1994), two forms of the face exist; the reflective and the intensive. 
These two forms prescribe “conditions of possibility contained within a face’s 
expressions” (Rushton, 2002, p. 231). The intensive form of the face is outward 
looking and confrontational – demanding instant action. It opens up possibility of 
connections with the world and potential worlds. Whereas, the reflective form of 
face is pensive, mysterious and inward looking. In the following example, the 
intensive face is shown. The subject experiences the power of the intensive face 
when she catches a glimpse of herself howling in the bedroom mirror: 
You tip your head back and howl with anguish. 
The reflection in the mirror mimics your every move. 
Out of the corner of your eye you catch a glimpse of your face in the 
mirror. 
Your face is distorted and red. Your mouth is a gaping black hole. The 
swelling looks worse. 
The crying stops. 
Suddenly witnessing the affective and intensive face calls the subject into action, 
so she stops crying and takes immediate action.  
The pen circles names in the directory. 
The action she takes is a line of flight to find a reconstructive surgeon to join her 
quest for the face/identity she desires. In this moment she deterritorializes away 
from the line of the medical discourse in a search for a partner who will 
reconstruct her face to her specifications. On this line of flight she deterritorializes 
away from the molarity of the biomedical discourse in order to reconstruct her 
face to a form that she feels she can live with. As I mention in chapter two, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) metaphor of the wasp and the orchid illustrate how 
transformation occurs through the process of both intersecting, working 
symbiotically, as extensions of each other, and becoming different, or becoming-
woman, in this process. This intersection involves both parties taking a line of 
flight into something new. The actions she takes culminate in a letter written to 







Dear Mr. W, 
 
Re: My facial surgery on 16th December, 19xx. 
 
As this is my final opportunity to communicate with you prior to my surgery, I am 
writing in lieu of an appointment in order to clarify with you the list of procedures 
I wish to have undertaken during my facial surgery. 
 
1. Nose: 
I wish my nose to be finer, narrower and more clearly defined. The upper lateral 
cartilage/bone graft on the left side appears to be more pronounced than the right, 
and the left lower lateral cartilage, has the appearance of being wider and plumper 
than the right. I want this to be narrower – with the lifting of the nose. 
 
List of procedures:  
i. The resection of the bone in my nose and the insertion of cartilage (harvested 
from my right ear) to create a soft, more natural nasal tip. 
ii. The insertion of hydroxyapatite to build up the anterior nasal spine, which will 
lift my nose from beneath creating a more acute nasal spine. 
iii. The insertion of cartilage or hydroxyapatite into the space below the cartilage 
of the septum, particularly on the right side), which will lower the septum in order 
to meet up with the hydroxyapatite implant on the anterior nasal spine. This will 
reduce the retrusion of the columella, thus facilitating a smooth, natural curve 
from the nasal tip to my upper lip. 
iv. Correction of the nasal dorsum: There is a marked step on the left hand side. 
The external septum is notched from the apex of the right nostril to almost the 
base of the left nostril. This gives an undesirable asymmetrical appearance. I wish 
this to be corrected with cartilage so that that the nasal dorsum ends 
symmetrically in a point at the base of my nose, in the centre at the top of my 
upper lip.   
v. Nostril asymmetry. Reduction of left nostril (to match the right nostril), in the 
process, correcting the notch at the apex of the left nostril. 
 95 
vi. Would the insertion of hydroxyapatite to the right upper lateral cartilage and 
the slight burring down of the bottom left of the nasal bone aid the illusion of 
straightness? 
 
2. Sinuses: Over the past year I have been besieged by a number of sinus 
infections. Can anything be done during the surgery to prevent these occurrences? 
 
3. Cheekbones:  
i. Left – insertion of a 6mm hydroxyapatite cheekbone implant. 
ii. Right – insertion of a 8mm hydroxyapatite implant. 
 
4. Left eye:  
Insertion of a hydroxyapatite implant to the orbital process of the malar bone, to 
correct the enopthalmous under my left eye. 
 
5. Removal of metal wires and screws in my face: 
Is it possible to remove the metal in my face, in particular the screw that holds the 
nasal bone graft on? 
 
6. Right facial nerve: 
Can this be reconnected? 
 
Thank you for your attention to this letter. I appreciate all your efforts on my 










The Letter: Discussion 
For the purpose of claiming this line of flight in the last story, I use the ‘I’ in this 
next section analysing this letter to my new surgeon, Mr. W. The above letter 
constitutes a continuation on from the Line of Flight story; through a process of 
trial and error, I find a reconstructive surgeon who supports my desires for my 
face, and who works to facilitate our shared vision for my facial reconstruction. In 
this way, similar to the wasp and the orchid, the surgeon and I, work 
collaboratively, and in the process transform one another. In this transformation, 
we both become becoming-woman, and become different to the selves we were 
before we took off on this line of flight.  
 
This collaboration represents a significant shift through deterritorialisation to 
another territory where I gain greater power/knowledge by becoming a student of 
plastic and reconstructive surgery, with the second surgeon as my teacher, and 
become a self, fluent in the specialised language of the biomedical discourse. 
Fluency results in an ability to communicate my vision for my reconstructed face, 
and brings forth the desired results. Through becoming fluent in the language of 
the biomedical discourse, my line of flight has de- and then re-territorialised on 
the molar striations of the biomedical discourse, this reterritorialisation is also part 
of my becoming.  
 
The surgeon too, deterritorialises out of the molar striations of the biomedical 
discourse that considers patients to be non-experts, and respectfully 
accommodates my new position. He takes seriously the explicit instructions I 
articulate in my letter. He tells me post-surgery that he has operated on my face 
with the letter beside my head on the operating table. That the surgeon listens with 
respect and complies with my wishes means a great deal to me. This act of 
listening almost eclipses the positive results of the surgery. Working in 
collaboration with the surgeon provides me with the space for this agency to 
happen, and he and I transform as a result of this line of flight. Through this 
process of becoming, I gain power/knowledge and agency. I take this 
power/knowledge forward into my counselling practice from a position of 
reasonable hope (Weingarten, 2010), a hope that I can join with clients on lines of 
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Now, when I look in the mirror, I am reminded of the desired outcome of the last 
line of flight/creative act, and migration of identity, and becoming-in-relation that 
I took with the second surgeon, Mr. W. This process of becoming-in-relation 
resulted in transformation for both of us; both of us became ‘becoming-woman’.  
For me, becoming-woman meant that I departed from the territory of subjugated 
patient and reterritorialised on the same but different biomedical territory. The 
line of flight with Mr. W. opened the space for me to gain some of his expertise in 
plastic and reconstructive surgery, and become somewhat fluent in the language 
of this specialty. Mr. W. deterritorialised from the biomedical discursive terrain to 
reterritorialise on the same but different territory. His becoming-woman resulted 
in a new receptivity and openness for accepting patients as expert. Writing about 
this experience of a line of flight, resulting in a migration of identity for me, re-
frames the experience of the car accident and surgeries and moves me toward a 
reconceptualising of the events that I recount in these stories. Rather than being a 
story of victimhood and failure, this experience of writing and analysing these 
stories from a Deleuzo-Guattarian frame moves me towards becoming a 
subjectivated self as event, or work of art in progress. The line of flight instigated 
by the car accident makes identity change or migration available, and I experience 
this as a growing openness to change.  
 
In the next chapter I present a fictional story that encapsulates and summarises the 
main findings of the thesis, and the implications of these findings for a 




Chapter Seven: To conclude 
 
Self as event: An ethical and sustainable practice. 
 
Reflexivity-in-action 
On the couch sits a thirteen-year-old boy and his mother.  
They talk about 
Listening to self to know that things aren’t right 
And when things are right… 
To speak up. 
 
Slowly… the counsellor scaffolds with them  
desiring to do the right thing. 
 
Questions cross the counsellor’s mind: 
Is standing up for others what he wants? 
Is his speaking injustice calling forward self-as-political? 
Where does this knowledge he holds come from? 
 
He talks 
About the support from his mum 
If things get bad. 
 
At the end of the session they leave, all three transported 
Where are they transported to? 
Is this moving toward an ethical self? Technologies of self? 
Is this self as art in process? 
Is this becoming other? Has the counselor been transformed? Have the others? 
Have they reconnected to their hopes and dreams? Has she supported them in 
this? 
Have they been compassionately witnessed? 
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Closing her door at the end of the day the counsellor looks back on the day and 
carries these questions with her as examples of the ethical practice she desires. 
This reflexive process is precious to her and she holds onto the hope that it will 
make possible the wasp-and-the-orchid-like transformation she desires.  This 
reflexive practice connects her to her desire to do the right thing – to become an 
ethical practitioner, and to highlight the movement of becoming as a work of art 
in process. She understands this reflexivity to be a continual process that makes 
possible a questioning of practice that explores effects of the work she does, how 
it contributes to other’s lives, and their contributions to her life. Together the 
mother and the son work against injustice. The boy’s mother is there to guide him 
to become an ethical self. In this way the three of them work in collaboration in 
the storying of new identity/ies. 
 
As the counsellor turns the car into a familiar street closer to home, the song from 
Rarotonga that the six-year-olds sang comes to mind. She thinks about how the 
six-year-olds used the song to question the educational practice of ranking, whilst 
at the same time exercising their power to belittle the other. She reflects on that 
time and hears the voices of the children singing. Her six-year-old self did not 
have the skills to articulate the multiple positions within power/knowledge that 
she herself took up, and the belittling she experienced and exercised. She knows 
now that by mastering the discourse she submitted to its striations. She chuckles 
to herself as she takes her briefcase from the car and walks up the steps to the 
house. How many non-failure stories has she heard, supported and collaboratively 
re-authored today? How has she called upon White’s (2002) failure conversation 
maps to open space for non-failure stories? Unlocking the door, she puts her 
briefcase down and reminds herself that hope is something that is done together, 
and that it is only possible to do what is do-able. 
 
This thinking and questioning she does demonstrates that she is a work-in-process 
of connecting with her desire to do the right thing, to become an ethical 
practitioner. The questions she poses are small steps towards the reflexivity she 
hopes to grow, nurture and foster in her self, and for the other. On the drive home 
the car becomes the vehicle of reflection, it is the vehicle of transport that brings 
about movement, transformation and change. It is a calm and tranquil thinking 
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space, where she can dwell and connect to her inner dialogue, and the knowings 
she feels in her body. Over the course of the journey she compassionately 
witnesses her self, and in the process becomes different/ce. This different/ce 
occurs because she opens her self up to compassionately witness self, and in the 
process makes a compassionate witnessing of other possible. The witnessing of 
other brings closer the doing of hope in community, while at the same time scales 
it down to make it doable, or reasonable hope. This heightened awareness makes 
possible the witnessing of sparkling moments in therapeutic conversations and at 
same time makes visible the possible in the impossible, and the impossible in the 
possible. 
 
She smiles as she waits for the kettle to boil. She thinks about the rescued speech 
poem she wrote for the boy and his mother. She is reminded of the letter she 
wrote to the second surgeon, Mr. W. She wonders about what it took for her to 
heard by the surgeon. She also dwells on how, through the relationship she had 
with Mr. W., she and he both deterritorialised on a line of flight which resulted in 
her transformation and transportation to new territory. In this place she got to 
know the relevant medical terminology and language to speak and be heard, 
which resulted in the re-composition of her face, as she saw fit. She wonders what 
it took for Mr. W. to compassionately witness her desire for the vision she had for 
the reconstruction of her face, and remembers with gratitude how he set down the 
position of expert enough to open a space for her to be heard. She thinks about 
how the experience of stepping into power/knowledge with Mr. W. has had 
ramifications for her practice as a counsellor.  
 
During the session with the boy and his mother she has suggested an outsider 
witness ritual to them. They will be inviting people to stand with them, in 
celebrating the new development. She thinks about how her own experiences of 
the outsider witnessing and the meaning of the practice when people are 
transported. She also wonders about the kind of listening that her classmates did 
when they witnessed her story of the six-year-old. She remembers the outsider 
witness ceremony that generated the story of the six-year-old, and the important 
role it played in the writing of her thesis of self as process, or becoming self-as-
event.  
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She thinks about the process of writing for thesis and the important role it plays in 
bringing the self into existence. The work she did in the thesis investigated the 
discursive entities that shape/d her, and how troubling discourses, unsettles 
sedimented practices that inform her identity/ies claims. The aim of the work was 
to open up possibility of transformation, of freeing up of the constraining lines of 
force. She was given an opportunity to explore a migration of identity.  
 
The tea in the cup turns cold in her hand as she thinks about how the 
autoethnography acted to open the possibility for conceiving of herself as a fluid 
self, as a work in progress of creating her self as a work of art. She marvels on 
how this attempt to write her subjectivated and reflexive self into becoming 
opened the possibility for storying an ethical professional identity.  
 
She rinses her cup, stretches, and collects the dog’s lead. She whistles for the dog. 
She puts on her walking shoes and steps outside. A beautiful autumn evening 
awaits her and the sunset is a mix of oranges, pinks, blues and violets. She 
breathes deeply as she walks along the road to the dog park. A light breeze 
brushes her face, and she feels fit, well and free from anxiety. She quietly 
celebrates how well she feels and marvels at how much energy she has even 
though she has worked with six clients that day, and written a recued speech 
poem. As she gazes out across the large field where the dog cavorts excitedly, she 
feels excited and hope-full about going to work the next day. She experiences a 
surge of gratitude as she thinks about the teachers on the Master of Counselling 
course who opened up new worlds for her with the introduction of the 
poststructuralist concept of the self as fluid. She reminds herself that it is the 
becoming stuck in the problem story of blame and failure that leads to exhaustion 
and burnout, and how the poststructural narrative therapeutic perspective opens up 
space to bring forward subordinate, alternative stories that have become 
overpowered by problem stories.  She reminds herself too, that taking up a 
position as expert in the lives of the people she works with can lead to further 
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